, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp 213-229

First online:

Mind in a Humean World

  • Jens HarbeckeAffiliated withEconomics and Philosophy, Witten/Herdecke University Email author 

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access


The paper defends Humean approaches to autonomous mental causation against recent attacks in the literature. One important criticism launched at Humean approaches says that the truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical-to-physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental-to-physical counterfactuals. This paper argues that special science causal laws and physical causal laws cannot be distinguished in terms of degrees of strictness. It follows that mental-to-physical counterfactuals are supported—or not supported—by laws in just the same way as are physical-to-physical counterfactuals.


Mental causation Counterfactual causation Humean metaphysics Causal laws Causal overdetermination