Abstract
Daniel Dennett maintains that regardless of determinism humans are both free to act and have a meaningful existence. Yet Dennett’s compatibilism entails that a felicity-advancing interaction with the world is all that we could wish for, which seems false. I also argue that Dennett’s attempt to define the terms central to this metaphysical debate fails. The weaknesses of Dennett’s case suggest that he is motivated more by his desire to complete the naturalistic project than he is by the pursuit of philosophical coherence.
Notes
See Daniel C. Dennett and Christopher Taylor, “Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities” (available at http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/TaylorDennett2010.pdf)
I have argued elsewhere that there is enough in Dennett’s work to make it obvious that he is aware of this: see “Dennett’s Deism”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9279-9
References
Baer, J et al (2008) Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Dennett D.C. (1984) Elbow Room (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Dennett D.C. (1995) Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Penguin: London)
Dennett D.C. (2003) Freedom Evolves, (London: Penguin)
Frankfurt, H.G. (2003) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Kant, I (1997) “The Critique of Practical Reason”, Cambridge University Press, translated and edited Mary Gregor
Nozick, R (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
Seager, W.E. (2000) “Real Patterns and Surface Metaphysics”, in Dennett’s Philosophy—A Comprehensive Assessment, ed. Don Ross et al (London: The MIT Press)
Smart, J.J.C. (2003) “Free Will, Praise and Blame”, in Free will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Strawson, P (2003) “Freedom and Resentment”, in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Watson, G (2003) “Free Agency”, in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Wolf, S (2003) “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
About this article
Cite this article
Ross, C. Dennett on Free Will. Int Ontology Metaphysics 12, 137–149 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0082-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0082-6