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Dennett on Free Will

Metaphysica

Abstract

Daniel Dennett maintains that regardless of determinism humans are both free to act and have a meaningful existence. Yet Dennett’s compatibilism entails that a felicity-advancing interaction with the world is all that we could wish for, which seems false. I also argue that Dennett’s attempt to define the terms central to this metaphysical debate fails. The weaknesses of Dennett’s case suggest that he is motivated more by his desire to complete the naturalistic project than he is by the pursuit of philosophical coherence.

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Notes

  1. See Daniel C. Dennett and Christopher Taylor, “Who’s Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities” (available at http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/TaylorDennett2010.pdf)

  2. Dennett 2003:42–3; see also Strawson (2003: 88)

  3. I have argued elsewhere that there is enough in Dennett’s work to make it obvious that he is aware of this: see “Dennett’s Deism”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9279-9

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Correspondence to Craig Ross.

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Ross, C. Dennett on Free Will. Int Ontology Metaphysics 12, 137–149 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0082-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0082-6

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