Abstract
This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza’s highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant’s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza’s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza’s definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant’s objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument’s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza’s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging.
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Notes
All references to the Ethics (Spinoza 1966) adopt the standard conventions: “p” stands for “proposition,” “s” for “scholium,” “d” for “demonstration.” Thus, 2p11d refers to the demonstration of the eleventh proposition in Book II; for the sake of simplicity, the book’s number is not specified in case of Book I.
The peculiarity of Spinoza’s version of the ontological argument is emphasized by J. Bennett 1984: 72.
The term “pantheism” is here used for the sake of convenience; the questions whether and in what sense Spinoza’s infinite substance deserves to be called “God” and, if yes, whether his metaphysics is a form of pantheism lie outside the range of the present paper.
“quaeso, mi amice, ut consideres homines non creari; sed tantùm generari, & quòd eorum corpora jam antea existebant, quamvis alio modo formata” (Spinoza 1925b: 14).
It could be objected that there is another class of ideas in Spinoza’s Ethics that has a claim to be identified with Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, namely what Spinoza calls “adequate ideas.” An adequate idea is such as to possess all the marks of true ones, but all internally: “By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea” (2d4; my emphasis). As Spinoza also explains immediately after having provided the definition, talk of “intrinsic denominations” is meant to exclude “the agreement of the idea with its object.” This is tantamount to saying that adequate ideas do not refer to their ideata, whereas true ideas do. Two questions need to be distinguished here: Should Cartesian clear and distinct ideas be identified with Spinoza’s true ideas or with adequate ideas? Is the idea conveyed by d6 adequate or true? The correspondence with Oldenburg suggests that, at least in the eyes of Spinoza, a clear and distinct idea is identical with a true one. What truly matters here, however, is to recognize that, for Spinoza, d6 expresses God’s true idea.
Spinoza writes at one point that p7 is obviously true: “if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of the truth of p7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for everyone, and would be numbered among the common notions” (p7s2).
This reading is provided by Marcus 1993: 173: “What is asserted in Proposition XI is that he exists in a certain way—necessarily. His existence simpliciter is never in question.”
This worry is expressed in Doney 1980: 42: “The principle… that what is not conceivable is not possible, seems to me to be by no means an unexceptional, or trivial or obvious principle. Interpreted in certain ways, it is a substantive principle which can be taken to have rather far-reaching and disturbing consequences.” If “conceivable” is interpreted in the right way, that is, by reference to clear and distinct ideas and therefore rationality per se, the principle is unproblematic.
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Acknowledgments
A previous version of this paper was read at the ETH, Zürich, in November 2009; I am indebted to the participants and especially to Prof. Michael Hampe, for the critical discussion and for important suggestions, and to Pauline Phemister for comments on an earlier draft.
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Basile, P. Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof. Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 17–37 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0056-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0056-0