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Prisons, politics and organized crime: the case of Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract

Based on unique empirical data including interviews with inmates and criminals, the article discusses the informal governance system in the prison and its link with organized crime in Kyrgyzstan. It accomplishes two main tasks. First it looks at the inmate governance structure and demonstrates the change that reflects the general transformation in the thieves’ world and second, it shows how the political environment shapes internal prison dynamics and demonstrates the impact of regime transitions on penal institutions. It argues that political transitions disturb the existing power equilibrium between political elites and criminal leaders that leads to an attempt to curb the thieves’ influence in the prison that in turn leads to the prison riots.

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Notes

  1. aka ‘Iron Felix’, the propagator of the ‘red terror’ in post-Revolution Russia and one of the founders of Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage), who was involved in numerous executions, assassinations, and abuses since 1917.

  2. There are 32 penal institutions in Kyrgyzstan, among them 6 investigative detention facilities (SIZO in Russian), 15 colonies, and 11 correctional institutions. The State Penitentiary Department employs 1,100 individuals that look after more than 9,800 inmates. The colonies are Soviet-era camp-style prisons where prisoners live in barracks each with 40 to 100 beds.

  3. In the references the inmates are coded accordingly with the number and ‘caste’ they belong to. For instance, ‘interview with 1/B’ signifies the first respondent from the btalnye and ‘interview with 3/M’ would mean the third respondent from the muzhiki.

  4. The fact that prison administration selected the respondents does not lead to bias. The inferences I make are frequently cross-checked through many separate interviews in different prisons (as well as the interviews with the law enforcement officials) and thus triangulated. Even if the officers in one prison selected inmates, they are not able to coordinate the selection process across several prisons. Second, I established the general categories (three inmates from each ‘caste’) that controls for potential bias. The officers could not bring a representative of ‘opushenie’ instead of a representative of ‘blatnye’. You can tell from the behaviour and rhetoric which caste the inmates belong to.

  5. Interview with inmate 2/M, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan;

  6. Omurbek Suvanaliev (former policeman), interview by the author, 25 January 2012, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;

  7. There is a debate whether these events were genuine revolutions or the coup-d’etats.

  8. For a useful discussion of structural and proximate causes see Martin and Zimmerman (1990).

  9. The functional model views the inmate structure as delineated by the prison environment and shaped in response to the ‘deprivation’ of imprisonment while the importation model looks at the inmate system as being reflective of pre-existing criminal structures, values, and roles acquired by the inmates outside of prison and ‘imported’ into the penal institution.

  10. in Russian criminal slang obizhat, opustit (nmeaning hurt, offend)

  11. This is similar to how prisoners are divided in the prisons of Russia and Kazakhstan. See Abramkin (2008), ICG (2009), and Kramer(2010).

  12. The trade and catering business is widely regarded as the traditional niche of ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan

  13. Interview with criminal T., former member of ‘Akmatbayev group’, March 2012

  14. Interviews with inmate 1/O, 2/O 1/M, 2/M and 3/M, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan; Interviews with inmate 1/O, 3/O 2/M and 4/M, colony 3, 16 February 2012, Novopakrovka.

  15. Interviews with inmate 1/O, 2/M and 3/M, detention facility N1, 27 February 2012, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Interviews with inmate 2/O, 1/M and 4/M, colony 3, 16 February 2012, Novopakrovka.

  16. There are no precise numbers on the amount of money accumulated in vorovskoy obshchak. Criminal T. former smatryashi of thief’s obshchak reported that monthly he had 1 200 000 soms (roughly 25 thousand USD) available. According to the spokesman of State Penitentiary Department, up to 180 thousand USD was going to vorovskoy obshchak every month from all prisons, see 24.kg (2012).

  17. Interviews with inmate 2/O, 2/M and 3/M, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan; Interviews with inmate 1/M and 2/M, 3/O, colony 3, 16 February 2012, Novopakrovka.

  18. Interviews with inmate 1/M, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan.

  19. The emphasis contained is original and not belonging to the author. Interviews with inmate 1/O, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan.

  20. Marat Kaipov (former Minister of Justice), interview by the author, 17 February 2002, Bishkek.

  21. Omurbek Suvanaliev (former policeman), interview by the author, 25 January 2012, Bishkek;

  22. Sergey Sidorov (Head of the Public Supervisory Body of Kyrgyz Special Services), interview by the author, 28 February 2012, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. According to AKIpress (2005) police recovered arms and drugs after the colony was stormed in November 2005.

  23. Interviews with the officers of State Penitentiary system, 20 February, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

  24. The RFE article also mentions that Batukaev occupied a whole floor that included 16 rooms, where he kept three mares and 15 goats.

  25. Interviews with inmate 2/O, 1/M and 3/M, colony No1, 5 March 2012, Moldovanka, Kyrgyzstan; Interviews with inmate 1/M and 2/M, colony 3, 16 February 2012, Novopakrovka, Kyrgyzstan.

  26. Shairbek Juraev, American University of Central Asia, Interview by the author, 19 January 2011, Bishkek; Omurbek Suvanaliev, interview by the author, 25 January 2012, Bishkek; Kairat Osmonaliev, former policeman and now vice-rector of Diplomatic Academy, Interview by the author, 18 January 2011, Bishkek.

  27. Suvanaliev, retired police general, Interview in Delo No (2011); Beknazarov, former General Prosecutor, interview in Gezitter.org (2012).

  28. Kalibek Satvaldiev (Head of Anti-Organized Crime Unit, Ministry of Interior) interview by the author, 26 January 2012, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Melis Turganbaev (Deputy Minister of Interior) interview by the author, 6 February 2012, Bishkek.

  29. Tolekan Ismailova (Director, NGO Citizens Against Corruption), interview by the author, 27 January 2011, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

  30. Sheishenbek Baizakov (chairman of State Penitentiary Department), Interview by the author, 25 January 2012.

  31. Kalibek Satvaldiev (Head of Anti-Organized Crime Unit, Ministry of Interior) interview by the author, 26 January 2012, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

  32. Kuanyshbek Kenebaev (Deputy Chairman of State Penitentiary Department), Interview by the author, 1 February 2012.

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Acknowledgments

The research in January-February 2011 was funded by TraCCC, George Mason University. The research in January-March 2012 was part of my role as a consultant to the Kyrgyz government on issues of organised crime. I was based at National Institute of Strategic Studies under the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan. The author is grateful to Dr. Chingiz Shamshiev for his help in organising access to relevant government structures in Kyrgyzstan, to Dr. Timothy Wittig for the comments and to three anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. The author also acknowledges the help of David Macrdie in editing the manuscript.

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  1. Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Alexander Kupatadze

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Kupatadze, A. Prisons, politics and organized crime: the case of Kyrgyzstan. Trends Organ Crim 17, 141–160 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-013-9208-2

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