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The evolution of magnanimity

When is it better to give than to receive?

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Abstract

Conspicuous consumption associated with status reinforcement behavior can be explained in terms of costly signaling, or strategic handicap theory, first articulated by Zahavi and later formalized by Grafen. A theory is introduced which suggests that the evolutionary raison d’être of status reinforcement behavior lies not only in its effects on lifetime reproductive success, but in its positive effects on the probability of survival through infrequent, unpredictable demographic bottlenecks. Under some circumstances, such “wasteful” displays may take the form of displays of altruistic behavior and generosity on the part of high status individuals, in that is signals the ability to bear the short-term costs of being generous or “cooperative,” while at the same time reinforcing the long-term benefits of higher status.

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Correspondence to James L. Boone.

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James L. Boone is an associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of New Mexico, where he carries out research in behavioral ecology and the archaeology of complex societies. His current interests are in the evolution of social status reinforcement behavior and variation in patterns of conspicuous consumption in human history.

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Boone, J.L. The evolution of magnanimity. Hum Nat 9, 1–21 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y

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