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The Attractiveness of Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke

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Abstract

In his recent article in Sophia, Benedikt Paul Göcke concluded that ‘as long as we do not have a sound argument entailing the necessity of the world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism’ (Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism’, Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 75). As the article progresses, Göcke clarifies his view of what panentheism is, essentially identical to Göcke’s view of classical theism in every way, except in the world’s modal relation to God. This concept is vastly different to many of the panentheistic notions that are more commonly held. While it is not initially made transparent—especially with the label Göcke chooses to use—it becomes increasingly clear that Göcke critiques a God concept of his own making. More common variations of panentheism are contrasted with Göcke’s version, in order to provide a broader and more accurate view of the ancient concept, and to demonstrate that Göcke’s view of panentheism is idiosyncratic. It is finally explained that even if Göcke’s view of panentheism were definitive, he has not successfully argued for the relative unattractiveness of the concept, relative to his view of classical theism.

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Notes

  1. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism’, Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 61.

  2. A number of panentheistic versions are discussed by Philip Clayton, who makes use of both traditional Eastern sources and more contemporary Western sources. See Philip Clayton, ‘Panentheisms East and West,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 183–191. Dirk Baltzly discusses the possibility of a polytheistic panentheism being discussed in Plato’s Timaeus. See Dirk Baltzly, ‘Is Plato’s Timaeus Panentheistic?,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 193–215.; One particularly imaginative variant is Schelling’s notion that ‘God shit out nature’. See Tyler Tritten, ‘Nature and Freedom: Repetition as Supplement in the Late Schelling,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 268.

  3. Göcke has somewhat of an ally in his fellow Christian theist, Patrick Hutchings, who notes the great diversity of panentheisms and yearns for a definitive panentheistic concept. Their shared wish might remain forever unfulfilled. See Patrick Hutchings, ‘Postlude: Panentheism,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 297–300.

  4. The definition comes from nineteenth-century German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. See Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 62.

  5. Yih-jiun Peter Wong, ‘Prelude,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 181.

  6. In the sense that he fails to reference any of their research, with the sole exception being Philip Clayton, who is hardly mentioned.

  7. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 65.

  8. Ibid.: 63.

  9. Ibid.: 68.

  10. Barua notes Christian reactions to notions of the world where God and the Universe are of the same substance, and Ramanuja’s belief that the ‘world literally is the body of Brahman’. See Ankur Barua, ‘God’s Body at Work: Ramanuja and Panentheism,’ International Journal of Hindu Studies 14, no. 1 (Barua 2010): 1–3.

  11. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 63.

  12. Göcke’s support for the necessity of the world on panentheism is nicely summarised on page 66: ‘According to panentheism, “God requires a world”’. The quotation comes from philosopher Charles Hartshorne, who, as noted by Philip Clayton, ascribed a number of attributes to the panentheistic God which not all panentheists would agree on, and who is also ignored by Göcke when it comes to the issue of creatio ex nihilo. See Philip Clayton, ‘Panentheisms East and West,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 184.

  13. Carolyn Morillo recognised that one of the major problems with contingency arguments is the disagreement over the interpretations of key terms such as ‘necessary’. See Carolyn R. Morillo, ‘The Logic of Arguments from Contingency,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37, no. 3 (1977): 408.

  14. In other words, Göcke has not convincingly demonstrated that a necessary God could or has produced a contingent universe or that this is a crucial element classical of theism. For an interesting treatment on the supposed contingency of the universe, see Herman Philipse, God in the Age of Science?: A Critique of Religious Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 123–125.

  15. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 73.

  16. Stephen H. Phillips, ‘“Mutable God”: Hartshorne and Indian Theism,’ in Hartshorne: Process Philosophy and Theology, ed. Robert Kane and Stephen H. Phillips (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 113–134. This research has been reworked and modernised. See Ellen Stansell and Stephen H. Phillips, ‘Hartshorne and Indian Panentheism,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 285–295.

  17. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), p. 148.

  18. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 68.

  19. This stands in direct contrast to classical theisms that depend on creatio ex nihilo, which further indicate a total separation between God and humanity. See Edward Craig, ed. Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 590.

  20. When panentheism is taken to mean ‘the world is in God’, as it is in the article, it does not follow that the world must have been created. The world could ‘merely’ be an eternal part of the eternal God.

  21. Joseph Prabhu, ‘Hegel’s Secular Theology,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (Prabhu 2010): 224.

  22. Also referred to are the diversities, ambiguities and unanswered questions regarding such concepts. See Purushottama Bilimoria and Ellen Stansell, ‘Suturing the Body Corporate (Divine and Human) in the Brahmanic Traditions,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 239–240.

  23. It would seem, at least according to the authorities Göcke does choose to reference, that what he is describing is indeed not ‘true panentheism’. See Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), pp. 13–14.

  24. Ibid., p. 14.

  25. Barua concluded that Ramanuja would reject ‘creation out of nothing’, as he believed that the world always existed in the sense that it is literally of ‘the Lord’s Body’. See Ankur Barua, ‘God’s Body at Work: Ramanuja and Panentheism,’ International Journal of Hindu Studies 14, no. 1 (2010): 10, 21.

  26. Nikos Kazantzakis, Saint Francis (Chicago, IL: Loyola Press, 2005), p. 43.

  27. Such as those among the Indian panentheistic teachings or in the work of modern scholars such as Michael Levine and Purushottama Bilimoria.

  28. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 75.

  29. An obvious question would be why a critique of a God model conceived by Göcke—with no reference to believers or scholars who consider his idiosyncratic view significant—was necessary.

  30. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 73–75.

  31. For more on these criticisms, see David J. Chalmers, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?,’ in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Bede Rundle, Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 110.

  32. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 74–75.

  33. It seems that with ‘attractive’, Göcke means ‘plausible’. If it is granted that classical theism and panentheism differs on the concept of creatio ex nihilo (in his view, they do not), it would be interesting to see Göcke’s arguments on why creatio ex nihilo could be considered plausible (compared with the eternal world or world created ex deo, that is common to most panentheisms). It is worth noting that the Leibnizian question, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ is loaded. It seems to suggest that nothingness, itself an unknown concept, is the natural state and that the existence or appearance of something is the aberration. Tyler Tritten alludes to an improved question, recalling that the ‘traditional metaphysics of presence asked not why is there something rather than nothing but first and foremost: “What is?”’ See Tyler Tritten, ‘Nature and Freedom: Repetition as Supplement in the Late Schelling,’ Sophia 49, no. 2 (2010): 268.; For an interesting treatment of the something-nothing debate, including the flippancy of the intent of the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’, the need for classical theists to discuss the issue, and the assumptions commonly made about nothingness, see Purushottama Bilimoria, ‘Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something? An Essay in the Comparative Metaphysic of Nonbeing,’ Sophia 51, no. 4 (2012): 509–530.

  34. Which is indistinguishable from classical theism in all respects, except for the modal relation between God and the universe. That is of course, if the world is indeed contingent on classical theism. If it is not, Göcke’s concept is merely classical theism, renamed.

  35. Benedikt Paul Göcke, ‘Panentheism and Classical Theism,’ Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 61–62.

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    Raphael Lataster

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Lataster, R. The Attractiveness of Panentheism—a Reply to Benedikt Paul Göcke. SOPHIA 53, 389–395 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0436-y

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