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All Philosophers Go to Hell: Dante and the Problem of Infernal Punishment

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Abstract

We discuss the philosophical problems attendant to the justice of eternal punishments in Hell, particularly those portrayed in Dante’s Inferno. We conclude that, under Dante’s description, a unique version of the problem of Hell (and Heaven) can be posed.

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Notes

  1. English translations of the Divine Comedy are those of Robert Durling (Alighieri 1996–2010); Italian references are to the Petrocchi edition (Alighieri 1994).

  2. Despite the fact that this seems a counterintuitive commitment, it is a requirement for a theodicy of Hell based on retribution. As James Wetzel (2002) notes, without the commitment of infinite harm or sin committed by the sinners, ‘a retributively conceived Hell would be a theological disaster area’ (377).

  3. Or, to be precise, the sufferings are unchanging prior to the general resurrection. In fact, in Inferno 6.103-11, Virgil reminds the pilgrim (with an oblique reference to Aristotelian metaphysics) that the intensity of infernal suffering will increase after the general resurrection, at which ‘time’ even sinners will get their bodies back and so be forced to endure a greater intensity of suffering than is possible for their shades. See also Purgatorio 25 for Statius’ explanation of the quasi-embodiment of souls as ‘shades’ prior to the general resurrection.

  4. We should note that, in fact, we do not ourselves accept these commitments to the infinity of sin and the proportionality of punishment. See Adams (1975) for a survey of the now standard reasons for rejection, and see Aikin and Talisse’s appendix on the Problem of Hell in Reasonable Atheism (2011) for a brief review of those reasons. Those who reject the notion that there can be an infinite sin worthy of infinite punishment are committed to what Jerry Walls (1992 and 2010) calls the ‘proportionality objection.’

  5. The eighth circle is for the crime of ‘simple’ fraud, but Dante subdivides fraud into ten subcategories each punished in its own bolgia or ‘pocket’ within this circle.

  6. We should note that our exception of Jesus is only that he went below and was at least in proximity to Hell proper, as a place of eternal punishment. We are merely invoking the harrowing of Hell as mentioned in the Apostles’ Creed, Matthew 12:40, Acts 2:27, and the apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus.

  7. There is, arguably, an interesting exception to this in Limbo, for Virgil and the Pilgrim encounter four classical poets (Homer, Ovid, Lucan, and Horace) in a subcircle within Limbo before traveling with them inside the castle in which are housed the great shades of the noble pagans.

  8. As it turns out, Beatrice explains to the Pilgrim in Paradiso 4 that all souls in heaven are equally blessed and reside in the Empyrean heaven outside space and time. Thus, their reflected appearances to the Pilgrim in the hierarchically arranged celestial spheres according the qualities that they represent are accommodated to his intellectual needs rather than an indication of any true ranking of those souls.

  9. Consider that if punishment in Hell, like punishment in Purgatory, were rehabilitative, then there would eventually be good people being punished in Hell. That would be theologically unacceptable. Consequently, for those in Hell to deserve to be there for eternity, they either must not be remediable, or Hell’s punishments themselves must not be imposed for that purpose.

  10. See, for instance, Saint Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I.11-15 and 19–25, and Saint Thomas, ST I-II, q74-76, q82-83, and q87. It is important to note that this account of sin is distinct from that of venial sin, which, though still a failure of obedience to God, is not destructive of the relationship between the sinner and the creator. See Aquinas ST I-II, q87, a5.

  11. For the case that Hell is inconsistent with divine love, see Hick (1966), pp. 337–53, and Bell (2011). Further, the demand that the theodicy of Hell be consistent with the traditional notions of divine nature is required by Kvanvig (1993) as the issuant conception of Hell.

  12. See (Reference removed for blind review) for the development of this line of argument.

  13. We should note, further, that if this theory of the infinite moral harm of sin is true, then we must re-open the question of Purgatory. How, if all sin is infinite moral error, could some pay finitely for one infinite sin, but others must pay infinitely? There are, of course, possible answers to this in, for instance, St. Thomas’ distinction between venial and mortal sins mentioned above, but how applicable these are to Dante’s depictions remains to be seen.

  14. Thomas Talbott (1990 and 2001) has pressed a similar line in arguing that the knowing and free choice to be away from God is unintelligible. This seems right to us, but our account is that one could not deserve the punishment of an infinite crime if one did not knowingly and freely commit one, and that by hypothesis humans do not have that knowledge or freedom.

  15. Generally it is suggested that Dante is drawing upon depictions of the Elysian Fields (especially Aeneid VI.753-1070) in representing this portion of Hell.

  16. What Dante seems to mean in this regard is that, because the noble pagans are exemplars of the temporal virtues, they guide others to the possibilities of temporal perfection. Moreover, because spiritual perfection is not fully obtainable without the prior cultivation of temporal virtues, this would make such individuals capable of lighting a path even when they carry ‘the light behind’ them, as Dante puts it in Purgatorio 22, where he depicts Statius as explaining his conversion to Christianity (a conversion fabricated by Dante, it seems) as owing to his reading of Virgil’s fourth Eclogue.

  17. On this feature of the punishment for the noble pagans (notably Virgil), Wetzel applauds, ‘The sin of Virgil and his kind looks remarkably like courage,’ (385) but then alternately notes that this success occasions his sin, ‘because of his confidence in his own rectitude has left him without a God to seek’ (386). It strikes us as astonishing that the moral courage of those lacking faith thus becomes tantamount to hubris on this account, but this does seem to be the gist of Dante’s choice to describe only three souls in the entirety of the Divine Comedy as magnanimi: Virgil at Inferno 2.44 and Cavalcante di Cavalcanti and Farinata degli Umberti at Inferno 10.73. For a discussion of the classical and medieval valences of magnanimity, see Scott (1962 and 1977).

  18. To be more precise, Dante’s view—taking now Purgatorio and Paradiso into account as well as Inferno—would seem to be a synthesis of the Anselmian theory of satisfaction with the Abelardian emphasis on divine love. See, for instance, A.N. Williams’ discussion of the matter (2007, esp. at p. 203).

  19. Elenore Stump’s theodicy for the Inferno is that divine punishment in Hell is actually an expression of divine love for the people there, as ‘God’s love for human persons consists essentially in treating according to their nature’ (1986, 192). In the case of sinners, it is their ‘second nature’ to be vicious and live according to that vice, and God allows that life eternally. However, it seems that given this account and the antecedent conditions of fallenness, all deserve Hell. In fairness to Stump, given their natures, God could not save the fallen without violating their free will. But this reasoning generalizes, as by hypothesis, to the view that we all lack the cognitive and moral natures to avoid Hell without grace. In what way then, is grace not a similar violation?

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Caleb Clanton, Michael Hodges, Andrew B. Johnson, Robert Talisse, Julian Wuerth, and the audience at the 2011 Midsouth Philosophy Conference for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Correspondence to Jason Aleksander.

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Aikin, S., Aleksander, J. All Philosophers Go to Hell: Dante and the Problem of Infernal Punishment. SOPHIA 53, 19–31 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0383-z

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