Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God
First Online: 22 December 2010 DOI:
10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5 Cite this article as: Janzen, G. SOPHIA (2011) 50: 331. doi:10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5 Abstract
This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.
Keywords Pascal’s wager Theoretical rationality Prudential rationality Probability assignments References
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