, Volume 50, Issue 3, pp 331-344

First online:

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

  • Greg JanzenAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of Calgary Email author 

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access


This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.


Pascal’s wager Theoretical rationality Prudential rationality Probability assignments