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Making Sense of Child Welfare When Regulating Human Reproductive Technologies

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Abstract

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test.

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Notes

  1. Of course, there are other legal and ethical issues to be considered with regard to commercial surrogacy arrangements beyond the scope of this paper, such as whether it objectifies and uses women as means to an end, particularly in situations in which the surrogate and commissioning couple are from different socioeconomic strata and/or countries. See, for example, Scott Carney’s chapter “Cash on Delivery” in The Red Market (2011) on commercial surrogacy organizations in India.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Health Sciences, Bioethics Centre, P.O. Box 913, Dunedin, 9054, New Zealand

    John McMillan

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  1. John McMillan
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Correspondence to John McMillan.

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McMillan, J. Making Sense of Child Welfare When Regulating Human Reproductive Technologies. Bioethical Inquiry 11, 47–55 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-013-9495-y

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