NanoEthics

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 43–48

Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: A Response to Thompson

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyTexas A&M University
Critical Discussion Notes

DOI: 10.1007/s11569-011-0115-1

Cite this article as:
Palmer, C. Nanoethics (2011) 5: 43. doi:10.1007/s11569-011-0115-1

Abstract

In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even deeper than Thompson suggests.

Keywords

Paul ThompsonEthicsAnimalsLivestockAnimal rightsNanotechnologyBiotechnologyNon-identity problem

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011