Abstract
Islamist parties espouse a socio-political platform that rests on the notion of creating an Islamic order and the application of the Islamic Sharia as a normative/legal and authoritative power structure. Progressive/Democratic Islamists is a term coined by some scholars to account for the emergence of new actors within the Islamic ranks starting from the 1990s in several Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Turkey, Egypt and North African countries. These actors depart from authoritarian political interpretations of Islamic texts, calling for a rationalist interpretation of Islamic idioms emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with democracy, pluralism, human rights and grassroots empowerment. This article analyzes the case of the Strong Egypt party (SEP) in the wake of the 2011 uprising in Egypt. It problematizes the identity of the party and its location in the ideological and political spectrum in Egypt. The article argues that the SEP claims a mixture of cultural conservatism, economic progressivism and political democracy, but that this mixture suffers from lack of depth, sophistication and a genuine social constituency and project.
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Notes
al-Anani, K. (2007a). Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Misr: shaykhukha tusari‘ al-zaman. Cairo: Maktabit al-Shuruq al-Dawliya. {Arabic}.
al-Anani, K. (2007b). Third generation political Islam. Islamists Today, 30 July. http://islamists2day-e.blogspot.com/2007/07/third-generation-political-islam.html.
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al-Anani, K. (2007d). Brotherhood youth: a time bomb. Islamists Today, November. http://islamists2day-e.blogspot.com/2007/11/brotherhood-youth-time-bomb.html.
al-Anani, K. (2007e). MB: Ambiguous future. Al-Ahram Weekly, 6 December 2012.
Bayat, A. (2007). Making Islam democratic. California: Stanford University Press.
Abu al-Fotouh is a medical doctor by training and an MB member since the late 1970s. He assumed key responsibilities in MB activism and in the doctors’ syndicate since the 1980s. He served as a member of the guidance bureau of the MB (the key executive body of the MB) during 1986–2010. He became renowned for his open-minded and democratic political and intellectual viewpoints that endorsed the values of democracy, pluralism and human rights. This cast him as the most important figure in the reformist faction within the MB during the 1990s and 2000s. He lost his seat in the guidance bureau in 2010 in the face of a conservative backlash within the organization. In May 2011 he announced his intentions to run for the presidential elections, which cost him his MB membership. He was fired because of his defiance of the MB decision, back then, not to nominate any presidential candidate.
Interview by the author with Fikry Nabil, SEP Political Communication committee member, Cairo, February 27th 2013.
Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, SEPs official spokesman, Cairo February 4th, 2013.
Ibid.
Ibid. The results of al-Ahram and Baseera center opinion polls are published in al-Ahram newspaper (http://arabi.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/6516.aspx), al-masry al-youm newspaper (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/807336), and al-Shorouk newspaper (http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=03052012&id=d2f2d618-ae82-4e7f-8158-c6306278fde7)
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, SEP political bureau member and political coordinator, Cairo, January 24th 2013.
In an internal poll, about 67 % of those who endeavored to establish the party said they would quit if Abu al-Fotouh resigned (interview by the author with Fikry Nabil, Op. cit.).
Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, op.cit.
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, SEP secretary general, January 16th, 2012.
Ibid.
Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, op.cit.
“Strong Egypt document” accessed February 28th, 2013. http://www.scribd.com/doc/98734595/%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9
Interview with Ahmed Abdel-Gawwad, op.cit.
Several civil society organizations were formed subsequently like the Misr al-Mahrousa association in addition to the Strong Egypt student organization and other charitable, aid and developmental organizations.
SEP Party Platform (unpublished document), p.12
Ibid. pp. 14, 16, 18, 20, 23.
Ibid. pp. 13
Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Muhandes, op. cit.
Islam Lotfy is a lawyer and human rights activist and ex-member of the MB. He was the second man in command of the MB student activism in the late 1990s and early 2000s. He was identified as a key MB youth leader, an active participant in the January–February 2011 uprising and among the well-known figures of the ‘youth of the revolution’ (a loose category used in Egyptian media to refer to the young activists who spearheaded the January protests). He was fired from the MB in June 2011 after disagreements with the MB leadership’s non-revolutionary political standpoints.
Interview by the author with Islam Lotfy, ES ex-provisional chairman, Cairo, January 24th 2013.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, op.cit.
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op. cit.
Ibid.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, op.cit.
Cairo had more than 1000 members, Giza 700–800, al-Gharbeya 600–700, al-Beheira around 600, Asyut 600, Alexandria 400–500 members, al-Sharqiya 300–400, Kafr al-Sheikh 100–150, most of the upper Egypt governorates 100–150 members each and finally North and South Sinai and al-Wadi al-Jadeed 20 members each. Interview by author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, op.cit.
Ibid.
This equaled approximately USD 15.
According to Fikry Nabil, the Abu al-Fotouh presidential campaign’s ability to get donations and volunteer work was better. Donators are usually more motivated to pay for a candidate that can become the president in a few weeks. The situation is different for a newly created party whose political achievements (and hence the donations’ pay-off) will remain uncertain, probably for years. However, the party was going to experiment with more creative sources of fund-raising that would generate fixed monthly income or lump-sum money during elections days. Interview by the author with Fikry Nabil, op.cit.
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
Interview by the author with Ossama Delham, SEP Cairo office’s secretary general, Cairo, February 5th, 2013.
Interview by author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
According to Abdel Gawwad, they represent about 10 % of the party’s rankings, mostly concentrated in the political bureau and general secretariat but much less in the governorate secretariats. According to al-Muhandes, they count for more than half of the general secretariat members.
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
This group, in addition to al-Tayar al-Misri group, as well largely disliked the MB’s post-revolution politics, particularly the decision that only the FJP was to represent the MB members politically, and the MB’s opportunism during the revolutionary encounters with the SCAF on Maspero, Muhammad Mahmoud and al-Qasr al-‘Eini violent street battles between September and December 2011. Others left the MB later such as al-Muhandes who resigned from the MB management of student activism in Azhar University (where he was student activity supervisor) in January 2012 after futile attempts at ‘reform from within.’ Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, Op.cit.
When asked about the SEP’s identity, Hassan al-Beshbeeshi replied, ‘a party whose president is Abu al-Fotouh, his political bureau head is Hassan al-Beshbeeshi and his deputy is Mustafa Kamsheesh, what do you think its identity will look like?’. Interview by the author with Hassan al-Beshbeeshi, SEP political bureau head, Cairo.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, opt.cit. Fekry Muhammad gave higher estimates for their proportion, saying that they constituted the majority of ex-MBs in the leadership.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, Cairo, August 2013.
The renowned intellectual and historian Tariq al-Bishri provided a blueprint of this concept in his works. For an updated discussion of this concept see Al-Bishri,Tariq (2012). al-Tayar al-Assasi lil Umma. Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk.
It is interesting to juxtapose SEP to the predominantly urban poor target groups of the Nasserite Popular Current (led by the ex-presidential candidate and political maverick Hamdeen Sabahy) and the upper-middle class audience of al-Dostour party led by the Nobel laureate and political leader Muhammad al-Barade’i.
For instance, SEP strongly opposed the constitution’s articles on the authorities and prerogatives of the military institution. Yet the SEP failed to communicate with the broader population on the gravity of this point. Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
This uncertainty was highlighted by Osama Delham, one of the party leaders. Interview by the author with Osama Delham, Cairo office Secretary General, Cairo, March 5th, 2013.
Most of the party leaders interviewed projected a 5–7 % share for the party in the upcoming parliament.
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
Ibid.
Party leaders attributed this to the uncertainty of the transitional party structures in addition to the nation-wide political turmoil. However, the party planned to have more Women and Copts among its membership. Targets for women’s and Copts’ proportions in the party’s membership were 20 % and 1 % respectively by 2014. (Interview by the author with Osama Delham, op.cit.).
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
‘The MB still opts for charity-based politics because it is easier and more familiar. They escape the more consuming terrains of developmental politics and engagement with governmental and municipal politics. Besides, charity-based politics is eventually unrewarding because it taints charity with political opportunism, and hence renders it incredible and eventually unpopular. It creates enmities among people as it is unsatisfying to everybody. For example, a typical MB tactic of providing subsidized consumer goods at the local level is very likely to make the local shop-keepers and traders unhappy.’ (Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.)
‘The majority within the party, though not a crushing majority, clearly disfavors any call for regime overthrow or participating with the NSF in its current formation.’ Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
SEP opposed Morsi’s decrees and the constitutional announcement once it was declared on 24 November 2012. SEP party organized several mass demonstrations in defiance of the decrees in the Presidential palace vicinity on 28 November, in Tahrir square on 29 November, and organized a mass rally at Cairo University on 23 November.
‘We couldn’t join the National Salvation Front because it is inclusive of many old regime and conservative figures. And we are originally in opposition to the MB government and presidential institution […]. So, we preferred not to join either side. But, alas, we offered our initiative to the presidency as an exit-strategy to rescind the constitutional declaration that was rejected on our part because of its undemocratic substance.’ Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
‘Siding with the MB would have been undoubtedly beneficial in terms of seats in the shura council and cabinet and help in the upcoming elections. On the other hand, siding with the NSF could have put us in the embrace of the big opposition front and hence bode in true colors among a polarized climate that hates grey standpoints no matter how sophisticated, composed and well-intentioned they are […]. Nevertheless, we preferred the sophisticated and centrist position knowing in advance that it has few consumers in such a climate of polarization. But, we persevered to maintain the party’s structure and secure its independent line as our present and future policy option.’ Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, Op.cit.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Othman, op.cit.
According to al-Muhandes, the more revolutionary group within the party leadership like him, Osman and others made extreme efforts to sell their principled and political rejection of the draft constitution within the party circles. An ad hoc committee visited 14 governorates and directly engaged with party members there to raise and justify the anti-constitution argument. As a result, almost 72 % of the party members agreed to say NO to the constitution in an internal opinion poll. (Interview by the author with Muhammad al-Mohandes, Op.cit.)
Interview by the author with Ahmed Abdel Gawwad, op.cit.
A typical representative of al-Wasat party’s political line is Muhammad Selim al-‘Awwa. He is a renowned lawyer and Islamist intellectual who developed very close relationships with state institutions (including security and military institutions under Mubarak) and regional interests in the gulf countries.
Al-Wasat party representatives in the constituent assembly lobbied actively for a presidential system. They were also ardent supporters and apologetics of the SCAF politics during the transitional period between February 2011 and June 2012.
Many businessmen who could not penetrate the closed circles of the MB found refuge in al-Wasat party.
http://www.alwasatparty.com/defult_inner.php?id=1&namefrm=9, accessed 1 February 2013.
Apparently, this policy paid dividends in the form of several political positions, including two cabinet ministers in the care-taker government under president Morsi, and seats in the Constituent Assembly and Shura council.
Interview by the author with Islam Lotfy, ex-acting chairman of ES, Cairo, 24 January 2013.
In Islam Lotfy’s perspective, Hassan al-Banna’s original Islamist project was distorted by Sayyid Qutb and then completely eclipsed by the later generations starting from the 1970s. (Ibid.)
Ibid.
The list includes Cairo, Alexandria, Red Seas, Sharqiya, Menoufeya, Gharbeya, Suez and Giza.
The best performances by ES candidates were Islam Lotfy in al-Haram-Giza where he ended up third on the individual tally behind the MB-backed Muhammad Abdel Mone’m al-Sawi and the Salafist candidate. In addition, al-Qassass finished third after the Egyptian bloc and Wafd party lists in Heliopolis.
Interview by the author with Islam Lotfy, op.cit.
Noticeably, two members from ES (Abdel Rahman Haridi and Ahmed Osama) were selected by Morsi to be among his appointed Shura council members.
Such as Muhammad Othman and Ahmed Abdel-Gawwad.
Strong Egypt activists refuted this description. Muhammad Osman believed that Abu al-Fotouh provided the best type of a leadership, i.e. an inspirational and motivating but not a dictatorial leadership who exerts too much of a control.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Affan, ES member, Cairo, 10 March 2013.
Internal voting results were indicative in this respect. On 8 March 2012, ES members voted on their candidate for the presidential elections. 77 % of the votes went to Abu al-Fotouh. However, 83 % of ES members voted no on any merger with Strong Egypt afterwards (interview by the author with Islam Lotfy, op.cit.).
The leftist group coalesced around some renowned leftist intellectuals and activists such as Rabab al-Mahdi and others.
Interview by the author with Muhammad Affan, op.cit.
References
Raymond, W. B. (2003). Islam without fear: Egypt and the new Islamists. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Zeghal, M. (2008). Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics. Trans. George Holoch. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
Other Documents
ES Party (undated). Party Platform. Unpublished document.
al-Wasat Party. 2013. Party pPlatform. Cairo.
Strong Egypt Party. Strong Egypt Document. Accessed February 28, 2013. http://www.scribd.com/doc/98734595/
Strong Egypt Party (undated). Party Platform. Unpublished document.
Strong Egypt Party (undated). Organizational Bylaws. Unpublished document.
Websites
ES Party: https://www.facebook.com/TMParty
al-Wasat Party: http://www.alwasatparty.com/index.php
The Strong Egypt Party: https://www.facebook.com/MisrAlkawya
Newspapers
Al-Ahram
Al-Masry Al-Youm
Al-Shorouk
Al-Watan
Al-Youm Al-Sabi‘
List of Interviews (all held in Cairo)
Abdel-Gawwad, Ahmed. Strong Egypt Party secretary general, on 16 January 2013.
Affan, Muhammad. ES Party member, on 10 March 2013.
Al-Houdaiby, Ibrahim. Researcher on Islamist movements and Abdel Moneim Abu al-Fotouh presidential campaign advisor, on 15 January 2013.
Al-Mohandes, Muhammad. Strong Egypt Party official spokesman, on 4 February 2013.
Al-Qassass, Muhammad. Acting vice president of ES Party, on 1 February 2013.
Delham, Osama. Strong Egypt Party Cairo office secretary general, on 5 February 2013.
Fikry, Muhammad. Strong Egypt Party political communication committee member, on 27 February 2013.
Lotfy, Islam. Ex- provisional chairman of ES Party, on 24 January 2013.
Othman, Muhammad. Strong Egypt Party political bureau member and political coordinator, on 24 January 2013.
Salah, Ahmed. Strong Egypt Party member and Abu al-Fotouh presidential campaign coordinator, on 24 January 2013.
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El Sherif, A. The Strong Egypt Party: representing a progressive/democratic Islamist party?. Cont Islam 10, 311–331 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-016-0369-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-016-0369-z