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Notes
A rather stable finding, however, is the expectedly negative relationship between global economic growth and IMF lending.
In Chapter 3, for instance, IMF arrangements up to only 2000 are included in the analysis.
My word choice of international politics is explained by the fact that the authors account for domestic politics, such as the presence of veto players (Chapter 6), and that the question here concerns undue great power influence.
In contrast, the reviews of the literature on the implementation of IMF programs and IMF programs and economic growth (respectively, in Chapters 6 and 7) are outstanding.
The chapter’s empirical tests rest on a dependent variable that measures whether or not a country signed a conditional program (p. 96–97).
While the IMF’s Investment Account was authorized in 1978 by the Second Amendment to its Articles of Agreement, it was not activated until 2006 (IMF 2014). The IMF’s ability to use gold in its operations is limited and hinges upon the Executive Board’s approval through a special majority, and the members need to permit the usage of their quotas in investment ventures.
References
IMF (2014). IMF financial operations. In Washington. D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Kaya, A. (2015). Power and global economic institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stone, R. (2011). Controlling institutions: international organizations and the global economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Kaya, A. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands. 2016. The International Monetary Fund: Distinguishing Reality from Rhetoric (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar). Rev Int Organ 11, 391–395 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9257-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9257-9