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A critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge

  • Research Article
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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Abstract

“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072, China

    Sun Si

Authors
  1. Sun Si
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Correspondence to Sun Si.

Additional information

__________

Translated from Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature), 2005, (3): 46–52

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Sun, S. A critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Front. Philos. China 2, 115–130 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0007-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0007-1

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