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Philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional design faculty and professionals

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An Erratum to this article was published on 17 December 2011

Abstract

The purpose of this research was to probe the philosophical beliefs of instructional designers using sound philosophical constructs and quantitative data collection and analysis. We investigated the philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional designers, including 152 instructional design faculty members and 118 non-faculty professionals. We used the Philosophy of Social Science Inventory, a 52-item questionnaire, to measure 20 beliefs within four categories. We probed four ontological beliefs (ontological realism, ontological relativism, physicalism, and idealism); five epistemological beliefs (epistemological relativism, fallibilism, epistemological objectivity, rationalism, and empiricism); three axiological beliefs (ethical realism, ethical relativism, and valueneutrality in research); and eight methodological beliefs (nomothetic, idiographic and critical methods, scientific naturalism, humanism, and quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods). Our research questions included (a) What are the predominant philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional designers? (b) Do instructional design faculty and non-faculty instructional designers, identifying with different research methodologies, hold different sets of philosophical beliefs? and (c) What relationships exist between philosophical beliefs and age, gender, ethnicity, level of education, and/or years of service? Overall, the philosophical profile of instructional designers can reasonably be described as pragmatic. Belief characterizations of methodological subgroups (e.g., those identifying with qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods research) generally supported our hypotheses. Although demographic variables (except gender) were not singularly important, our analyses suggest that a combination of ethnicity, gender, research preference, and level of education can be used to predict philosophical and methodological beliefs.

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Notes

  1. That’s because coefficient alpha indicates the internal consistency of items that are considered or known to be homogeneous; also, since coefficient alpha is strongly affected by the number of items, it will be inflated when calculated on the entire set of items of a multidimensional test (Cortina 1993; Johnson and Christensen 2011).

  2. A full report of the psychometric properties of the PSSI is in preparation for publication in a separate article by the original developers of the instrument (Johnson, Meeker, Loomis, and Onwuegbuzie) and the first author of the current article (Sheehan). After minor modifications, the instrument will be ready for general use by other researchers interested in measuring philosophical and methodological beliefs in different areas and relating those beliefs to other constructs. To obtain a copy and permission, contact Burke Johnson at BJohnson@usouthal.edu.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL, USA

    Michael D. Sheehan & R. Burke Johnson

Authors
  1. Michael D. Sheehan
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  2. R. Burke Johnson
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Correspondence to Michael D. Sheehan.

Additional information

An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11423-011-9229-y.

Appendix: descriptions of constructs measured by the PSSI

Appendix: descriptions of constructs measured by the PSSI

I. Ontological beliefs (beliefs about what is ultimately real or true)

  1. 1.

    Ontological realism is the view that at least some entities are real and independent of our experience or knowledge of them, and of our concepts of them. The opposite is ontological antirealism (which is the view that some entities that are currently claimed to exist are mind-dependent and that reality is at least partially constructed by human minds).

  2. 2.

    Ontological relativism is the idea that what exists can only be said to exist for this or that person or culture.

  3. 3.

    Physicalism (also called materialism) is the view that the real world is physical or material and that all phenomena can be completely described and explained using the concepts, laws, and entities of physics. There is no reality beyond what can be described and explained using the concepts, laws, and entities of physics.

  4. 4.

    Idealism is the nonphysicalist view that reality is fundamentally a mental state, and the world must be described and understood according to nonmaterial mental constructs such as beliefs, social structure, and culture

II. Epistemological beliefs (beliefs concerning the availability, nature, scope, sources, and standards of knowledge):

  1. 5.

    Epistemological relativism is a cluster of views that make the truth of certain statements dependent on the concepts or standards of a given group or individual. It places truth within the context of individual or social paradigms. The opposite of epistemological relativism is epistemological invariantism which holds that the truth or falsity of a given proposition has no necessary dependency upon context and makes a sharp distinction between the believer and the truth of what is to be believed.

  2. 6.

    Fallibilism is the view that human intellectual endeavors cannot be conclusively established. An example is Dewey’s warranted assertability. The opposite of fallibilism is infallibilism, which argues for the possibility of scientific certainty.

  3. 7.

    Epistemological objectivity (as opposed to epistemological subjectivity) is the adoption of a standpoint that is, as far as possible, value-neutral and free of social, psychological, or theoretical biases. Its opposite, epistemological subjectivity, argues that it is not possible to completely separate the knower from the known. Personal and social context will always influence an individual’s inquiry and research.

  4. 8.

    Rationalism is the doctrine that some knowledge can come from reasoning and thought without any experience or empirical research into the matter. That is, some knowledge is, or can be, fully independent of our experience.

  5. 9.

    Empiricism is the doctrine that knowledge originates in sensory experience. It disavows the possibility of a priori knowledge (i.e., knowledge from reasoning alone).

Axiological beliefs (beliefs about moral and normative concepts and the study of value, values, or value judgments)

  1. 10.

    Ethical realism is the view that at least some ethical or moral statements are true or false independent of the dispositions, beliefs, attitudes, or practices of a given society or individual.

  2. 11.

    Ethical relativism is the view that the truths of ethical and moral judgments are dependent upon individual or cultural context.

  3. 12.

    Value-neutrality in research promotes the ideal that scientific inquiry ought to be as value-neutral as possible. The opposite is value-promotion, which suggests that science neither can nor should attempt to be value-neutral.

Methodological beliefs (beliefs about methods and procedures, along with the assumptions and norms associated with those methods and procedures)

  1. 13.

    Nomothetic methods are concerned with identifying laws, and that which is predictable and general.

  2. 14.

    Idiographic methods are concerned with individual, specific, particular, and oftentimes unique facts rather than general laws.

  3. 15.

    Critical methods are focused on exposing and eliminating inequalities among people and societies.

  4. 16.

    Scientific naturalism is the doctrine that the focus of science should be on the natural or material world, and that researchers should search for physical causes of phenomena.

  5. 17.

    Humanism is the doctrine that research should focus on the human characteristics of people, including their freewill and autonomy, their creativity, emotionality, rationality, morality, love for beauty, and their unique characteristics.

  6. 18.

    Quantitative research methods rely on the assumptions, norms, and procedures sanctioned by the quantitative research methodological paradigm.

  7. 19.

    Qualitative research methods rely on the assumptions, norms, and procedures sanctioned by the qualitative research methodological paradigm.

  8. 20.

    Mixed research methods rely on the assumptions, norms, and procedures sanctioned by the mixed research methodological paradigm.

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Sheehan, M.D., Johnson, R.B. Philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional design faculty and professionals. Education Tech Research Dev 60, 131–153 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11423-011-9220-7

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