Abstract
It is uncontroversial that artifacts like statues and tables are mind-dependent. What is controversial is whether and how this mind-dependence has implications for the ontology of artifacts. I argue the mind-dependence of artifacts entails that there are no artifacts or artifact joints in the extra-mental world. In support of this claim, I argue that artifacts and artifact joints lack any extra-mental grounding, and so ought not to have a spot in a realist ontology. I conclude that the most plausible story about artifacts is that they are in minds of suitably intelligent creatures, and not the extra-mental world. Artifacts and their joints are merely mental projections onto a world of ‘indifferent materials’. With this established, I show how many cases of object coincidence, the view that more than one material object can be located in the same exact region of space-time, cannot occur.
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Notes
Two-thingers—those who embrace coincidence— as Stephen Yablo and Karen Bennett call them, include Rudder Baker (2000), Thomasson (2007a, 73–86), Hughes (1997), Lowe (2003), Fine (2003), Moyer (2006), Thomson (1998), Sutton (2012), Doepke (1982), Johnston (1992, 2006, 664–7) and Crane (2012). See notes 2–6 for some representatives of the “one-thinger” camp. Those who deny the problem is genuine argue there is no fact about the world that properly distinguishes or grounds the differences between the two purportedly coinciding objects. Those who pose this Grounding Problem include Zimmerman (1995, 85–100), Heller (1990, 30–2), Olson (2001), Bennett (2004), Sider (2001, 158–9) and Merricks (2001, 38–46; 130–4). Lewis (1986, 252) claims arguments for coincidence are invalid, even “absurd”. van Inwagen (1981, 128) claims simply to “not understand” the problem. See Paul (2010) for a nice synopsis of the debate.
A point recently highlighted by Thomas McKay (2015), who also notes the inevitable coincidence of an object and the “stuff” composing it.
I borrow the phrase from Elder (2007b).
The example is borrowed from Shoemaker (1998, 69–70).
Alan Sidelle (1989), a conventionalist about essences and kinds, argues that counterfactuals of the sort, “Even if humans didn’t exist, the world would still look very much like it does”, often relied on by realists, can be true even if the world in fact has no joints. Although I haven’t explicitly relied on such a counterfactual argument yet, I will draw on a modal variant below. Happily, Sidelle’s claims have already seen a realist rejoinder, and so I’ll grant myself use of such counterfactual arguments. See Elder (2006) for a response to such “realist-imitating counterfactuals”. See also, Elder (2007a, c).
See Tahko (2012) for other arguments for realism about both objects and kinds.
I’ll leave it to philosophers of religion to decide whether or not God can transform me into a poached egg while maintaining my identity.
Perhaps we follow Aristotle and say it’s a screwdriver “only in name”.
Natural is to be contrasted with artifactual, not supernatural. Note too, the lurking circularity. I won’t worry myself too much with it here because (1) it is not my goal to provide a reductive definition of artifacts, and (2) I take the distinction between genuine artifacts and “pseudo-artifacts” like man-made elements to be clear
Again, my aim in this paper is not to argue for what the real or most genuine material objects are, whether mereological simples, living beings, conscious beings, or some other entities. Recalling my assumptions in section 2.1 above, I’ll take the existence of things like lumps of gold and trees as pre-philosophical data.
Consider an arithmetical analogy. A K (artifact instance) is an x (lump of gold) and a y (intended feature), so that: K = x + y. To reasonably claim K is mind-independent, we’d want to see y exist without x in the world. For, if all that was mind-independent was x, we’d have no reason to suppose K as the sum of x and y was mind-independent. But, alas, the world tells us that nothing but x is mind-independent. We see no y by itself; we can’t subtract x from K and see y. y is in someone’s head! So why posit K as a whole as mind-independent? Think on this: have you ever encountered a statue (or any artifact) simpliciter?
This is not what Thomasson (2006, 353–6) calls a “nothing over and above” objection to statues. The mereological whole in this example, the mass of sodium, might be doing something over and above its parts (though I doubt this in the case of masses). Nor is this a causal redundancy argument against wholes. It is aimed at just artifacts, qua artifactual, whatever their mereological structure.
Lowe (2014, 23–6) argues, along lines similar to Baker, that certain artifacts, viz. machines, are mind-independent constituents of the world. For, he says, machines have unique “unifying principles of activity” and follow certain laws of nature, viz. “engineering laws”. That is, he takes machines to have internal essences, in a vaguely Aristotelian sense. However, we can dismiss Lowe’s argument on his own grounds. Consider two qualitatively identical engines (his preferred example): one made of sodium, the other steel. Both engines have the same unifying principle of activity (regulate air flow, move the pistons, turn the crankshaft, etc.). But now imagine both are left out in the rain. What happens? The sodium engine explodes, or fizzles, while the steel engine continues to function normally. Why? Because although both are identical machines, they clearly have different natures, i.e. principles of activity. (That is, sodium and steel have radically different capacities and powers.) This suggests that something besides machine essences are at work in objects, and so, they aren’t quite enough to get Lowe’s machines a respectable status in our ontology. (To recall an example from antiquity: if you bury a wooden bed in the ground, it will sprout a tree, not a bed. See Aristotle, Physics II.1.)
Franssen and Kroes (2014) argue for the mind-independent existence of artifacts in a fashion similar to Elder, but focus on morphology and historical lineage. Since their arguments are of the same kin, I take my response to Elder here to apply to Franseen and Kroes’ recent work too.
The approach is reminiscent of Searle’s (1969, 50–3, 1995, 23–9, 43–51) rule-following proposal for social, but primarily institutional, facts. For Searle, group intentionality (the “we intend” of several agents) follows a constitutive rule of the form “X counts as Y in C” to generate facts about institutional reality, e.g. that this is a $1 bill, that Barack Obama is President of the United States, out of “brute” facts, e.g. that this paper is made of cotton, that Barack Obama is a human. For now, the details are not as important as the general idea that through their conscious activities, agents may simply take some object as another. But, it’s worth noting that Searle is concerned with generating social facts and not countenancing social objects as mind-independent constituents of the world, as proponents of the “thinking-makes-it-so” approach are. More on Searle’s approach in section 5.1 below.
Lowe (2014, 20) calls the view “Conceptual Realism” and Thomasson “ontology made easy”.
In places, Thomasson seems to indicate she’s fine without counting artifacts among the “furniture of the world”. For instance, she writes (2001, 157): “Now it might be said that the realist can, perhaps, accept that there are facts of geography…and objects of geographic kinds involved (e.g. national parks), but that in virtue of their mind-dependence the realist must deny that they are part of the ‘furniture of the world’. If this is taken to mean that they are not among the mind-independent components of nature, this is fairly unobjectionable…” But, in other places (2003a, 605), she seems to suggest things like statues exist mind-independently inasmuch as the hunks of clay composing them exist mind-independently. Again, I won’t speculate on her ultimate opinion, but she doesn’t immediately appear committed to screwdrivers, statues and the like populating the mind-independent world in the way I find objectionable.
The pithy phrase is from Elder (2014, 41).
That is, there are no Czars of proper norms of regard or treatment. Nor do we need to say that if such proper features did exist, that they’d belong to artifacts above and beyond the indifferent materials of the world.
Here one might object: “But a world in which there exists nothing but intentions couldn’t plausibly be said to contain artifacts! That is, artifacts can’t be just intentions. For, if I have the requisite intention and concept for an artifact’s existence, and I then leave the building, we wouldn’t say an artifact has left the building too.” In response, I would admit it would be odd to say screwdrivers were just intentions and concepts if what it is to be a screwdriver is to drive in screws. For, mental states can’t drive screws, but mind-independent objects (like rods of steel with wooden handles) can. But note that if artifacts are intentions and concepts projected onto the world, this worry dissipates. For, projection would entail that we ordinarily take the indifferent materials being projected on, viz. a steel rod and wooden handle, to be that which is projected, viz. a screwdriver. But, as I’ve done my best to argue, taking x to be a screwdriver doesn’t, in ontological strictness, make x a screwdriver. Put differently, just because what can in fact instantiate our intended features is mind-independent, doesn’t entail that what our concept is of, viz. an artifact, is that mind-independent object doing the instantiation. Moreover, if what makes some indifferent materials an artifact, and not just some indifferent materials, is an intended concept—a mental state—why say the indifferent materials out in the mind-independent world are anything but indifferent materials?
One might here suggest that artifacts do have clear persistence conditions, and so, this might count in favor of their mind-independent existence. But, alas, if I’m right, we can still account for clear and precise artifact persistence conditions. How? By appealing to the concept of what it is to be an artifact of a certain kind. If statues are created to instantiate some property F, then statues exist just as long as they can, with a reasonable chance, instantiate F. That is, an artifact will exist so long as the indifferent materials it’s composed of have a reasonable chance of instantiating the relevant intended feature(s). Catherine Sutton (2012, 711–2) explains: “Consider two different scenarios, in which the inventor [of an artifact] has different purposes for her invention, and which lead to different answers about persistence. If she invented the widget to prop up heavy windows, then it could not survive being hollowed out because hollowing would compromise structural integrity, and part of being a widget is being able to hold open windows. If instead her widget was a representational tool to teach children about family trees… then surely the widget could survive being hollowed out. These persistence properties arise in virtue of the purpose of a kind, and purpose is determined by human intentions…”
The example is from Rea (2000, 184–5).
Many thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this family resemblance, and so the need for this discussion, to my attention.
Status functions are those which an object cannot perform just in virtue of its brute, physical properties. For instance, pieces of paper have the status function of serving as a medium of exchange, but not because of any of their brute, physical properties (although transportability helps). For, both paper currency and packs of cigarettes have, at any one time, served as mediums of exchange (Searle 1995, 42–3). Status functions are to be contrasted with causal agentive functions, those functions which a brute object may carry out just in virtue of its physical properties, e.g. as a screwdriver drives screws in virtue of its rigidity, shape, etc. (Searle 1995, 9–23, 43–5). Although Searle himself (1995, 41–6) claims only institutional facts are generated by the constitutive rule “X counts as Y in C”, I see no reason why, for purposes here, the rule cannot apply equally to other social objects, e.g. artifacts.
See Thomasson (2003b, 270–8) for a fine explication and discussion of Searle’s view in more detail.
See Searle (1995, 121) a helpful schematic of his taxonomy of facts.
Notable too is our shared commitment to capital “R” Realism. See Searle (1995, 149–98).
Context too is, I think, another important place where the two approaches differ. And I think the split is in my favor. For we might imagine cases where the Searlean view allows for a sort of artifact-artifact coincidence. Imagine some context C in which some X term is counted as two distinct Y terms, Y1 and Y2. For example, in C some block of marble (X) is a statue (Y1) and a pillar (Y2). On my approach, both Y terms are simply concepts projected onto the X term, but on the Searlean proposal, both Y terms exist in a realm of social facts. Now, the Searlean may respond that this sort of fact coincidence is unproblematic, but it seems plausible to me that it would be a genuine instance of artifact-artifact coincidence (or something similarly problematic)—one my approach could avoid.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to audiences at the University of Missouri – St. Louis, the University of Nevada – Reno, Eastern Illinois University, and Earlham College for helpful discussion, comments and questions. Thanks also to Jon McGinnis, Lauren Olin, Billy Dunaway, and Eric Wiland for constructive comments on previous drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Dan Korman for helpful feedback and direction.
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Renz, G. It’s All in your Head: a Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence. Philosophia 44, 1387–1407 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9777-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9777-9