Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The Three Rs: Retribution, Revenge, and Reparation

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Nearly all retributive theories of punishment adopt the following model. Punishments are justified when the wrongdoers receive the punishment they deserve. A deserved punishment is one that is proportionate to the offender’s culpability. Culpability has two components: (1) the severity of the wrong, and (2) the offender’s blameworthiness. The broader aim of this article is to outline an alternative retributivist model that directly involves the victim in the determination of the appropriate and just punishment. The narrower aim is to show that the methodology employed by Michael Moore (1997) in support of the standard retributive model in fact better supports this alternative model. Moore himself explicitly rejects the idea that victims can play a role in determining just punishments, because this would entail assigning different punishments to equally culpable offenders. When properly applied, however, Moore’s method for justifying retributivism results in an approach that directly involves the victim in the punishment process.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Morris (1968) for example. For the purposes of this paper, I will simply assume that these rationalist versions of retributivism have failed. For an excellent overview and critique see Burgh (1982)

  2. See Greene (2007), Singer (2005), Joyce (2006), and Sommers (2007) for examples.

  3. See Mackie (1982)

  4. One anonymous referee for this papers appears to be in this category, distrusting any theory of punishment that appeals to intuitions and feelings for support. Elsewhere (Sommers 2012) I have argued that virtually all theories of moral responsibility and desert appeal to intuition for justification whether they admit it or not.

  5. Nussbaum (1994) brought Wiesel’s story about the soldiers to my attention.

  6. Although in many cultures, “blood money” is considered a legitimate form of compensation.

  7. See Miller (2001)

  8. See Sommers (2009, 2012) for a discussion of honor cultures and third party punishment.

  9. See Murphy (2003)

  10. See e.g. Van Camp et al. (2013).

  11. Thanks to an anonymous referee for alluding to this possible response from Moore.

References

  • Braithwaite, John. In search of restorative jurisprudence. In: Lode Walgrave (Ed.), Restorative Justice and the Law (pp. 150–16). Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.

  • Burgh, R. (1982). Do the guilty deserve punishment? J Philos, 79(4), 193–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camp, V., et al. (2013). Victim satisfaction with restorative justice: more than simply procedural justice. International Review of Victimology, 19(2), 117–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christie, N. (1977). Conflict as property. Br J Criminol, 17(1), 1–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, vol. 3: the neuroscience of morality: emotion, disease, and development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joyce, R. (2006). The myth of morality. MIT Press.

  • Kundera, M. (1999) The unbearable lightness of being. NewYork: Perennial Classics.

  • Mackie, J. L. (1982). Morality and the retributive emotions. Criminal Justice Ethics, 1(1), 3–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. (2001). Disrespect and the psychology of injustice. Annu Rev Psychol, 52, 527–553.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore, M. S. (1992). Moral reality revisited. Michigan Law Review, 90(8), 2424–2533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore, M. S. (1997). Placing blame: a general theory of the criminal law. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, M. S. (1999). Victims and retribution: a reply to Professor Fletcher. Buffalo criminal law review, Vol. 3, pp. 101–125, reprinted (in German translation). In B. Schunemann and M. D. Dubber (Eds).

  • Morris, H. (1968). Persons and punishment. Sherwood J. B. Sugden (Ed.), Monist 52.4.

  • Murphy, J. G. (2003). Getting even: forgiveness and its limits. Oxford: Oxford UP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. J Ethics, 9, 331–352.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sommers, T. (2007). The illusion of freedom evolves. In: D. Ross, D. Spurrett, H. Kincaid and G. L. Stephens (Eds.), Distributed cognition and the will: individual volition and social context (pp. 61). MIT Press.

  • Sommers, T. (2009). The two faces of revenge: moral responsibility and the culture of honor. Biol Philos, 24(1), 35–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sommers, T. (2012). Relative justice: cultural diversity, free will, and moral responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philos Stud, 127(1), 109–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullis, P. (2013). Can forgiveness play a role in criminal justice? New York Times Magazine January 4.

  • Von Hirsch, A. (1978). Proportionality and desert: reply to bedau. J Philos, 75(11), 622–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Von Hirsch, A. (1992). Proportionality in the philosophy of punishment. Crime and Justice, 16, 55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Houston, 513 Agnes Arnold Hall, Houston, TX, 77204-3004, USA

    Tamler Sommers

Authors
  1. Tamler Sommers
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tamler Sommers.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sommers, T. The Three Rs: Retribution, Revenge, and Reparation. Philosophia 44, 327–342 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9706-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9706-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation