Skip to main content
Log in

Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not self-defeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Adapted from Kahane 2011, p. 106.

  2. The relevance of evolutionism for epistemology is a well known and debated issue. On that sort of ‘Darwinian epistemological dilemma’ which arises when we try to naturalize knowledge relying on evolutionism, c.f., e.g., Clark 1986, p. 151: “What is the proper attitude of the evolutionary epistemologist towards science? Should he regard science as disclosing (or aiming to disclose) information concerning the way the world is in itself, independently of the species-specific needs, bias and cognitive orientation of the human life-form? Or should he conceive it as intrinsically limited and indelibly marked with the stamp of his own humanity? Either way there is a problem. If he adopts the first, objectivist, interpretation he faces the charge of hypocrisy; why does he not extend the results of his conjectures concerning cognition in other species to the enquiring animal, man? To make that extension, and to regard our scientific knowledge as biased and limited in ways analogous to those attributed to the lower animals, is, however, to breed a deeper discomfort. For if he adopts a species-specific, non-objectivist account of scientific knowledge then the status of the evolutionary conjecture itself is brought into question.”

  3. On the difficulties of defending this kind of evolutionary reliabilism, see Sage 2004. For an introduction to the debate on the relation between fitness and truth, see De Cruz et al. 2011.

  4. Cellucci specifies that this objection “was raised in correspondence by Reuben Hersh, acting as advocatus diaboli, not because he shared it” (Cellucci 2013, p. 7, footnote 44). So, it is just for simplicity that in what follows we will refer to that objection as ‘Hersh’s objection’.

  5. This reference to the truth is due to the fact that the truth of mathematics is considered to be related to the certainty of its results, which is given by the reliability of the means used to reach such results, and by their coherence, given that there is no possibility of appealing to some form of empirical confirmation of the truth of a theory when dealing with mathematics. Indeed, Hilbert considered coherence as equivalent to truth: “If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one another, then they are true, and the things defined by the axioms exist. This for me is the criterion of truth and existence” (Hilbert 1980, p. 42). Thus, if by Gödel’s results there cannot be absolute certainty in proving the coherence of a mathematical theory, then such theory cannot be said to be absolutely true.

  6. Cf. De Cruz et al. 2011, p. 518: “An EDA is constructed by negating at least one of the crucial EA [Evolutionary Argument] premises, in particular about the relative importance of natural selection, and about its truth-tracking ability.”

  7. See above footnote 6.

  8. On the fact that the main idea which lays behind scientific realism is the intuition that the empirical success of a scientific theory can be explained by nothing but its truth, see, e.g., Worrall 1989.

Abbreviations

EDAs:

Evolutionary debunking arguments

Vs-MAT:

Hersh’s objection

MAT:

Cellucci’s response to Vs-MAT

Vs-EDAs:

De Cruz’s objection to EDAs

Pro-EDAs:

Response to Vs-EDAs

EDAM:

Evolutionary debunking argument for mathematics

Pro-EDAs+EDAM:

Extended response to Vs-EDAs

EAM:

Evolutionary argument for mathematics

EDA*:

Simplified Version of Pro-EDAs+EDAM

References

  • Cellucci, C. (2013). Rethinking Logic. Logic in relation to mathematics, evolution, and method. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. J. (1986). Evolutionary epistemology and the scientific method. Philosophica, 37, 151–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Cruz, H. (2004). Why humans can count large quantities accurately. Philosophica, 74, 63–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Cruz, H. (2011). Through a mind darkly. PhD Thesis, Groningen: University of Groningen.

  • De Cruz, H., & De Smedt, J. (2012). Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs. Philosophical Studies, 157(3), 411–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Cruz, H., & De Smedt, J. (2013). Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions. Synthese, 190(1), 3–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Cruz, H., Boudry, M., De Smedt, J., & Blancke, S. (2011). Evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification. Dialectica, 65(4), 517–535.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hilbert, D. (1980). Letter to Frege 29.12.1899. In G. Frege (Ed.), Philosophical and mathematical correspondence (pp. 41–43). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahane, G. (2011). Evolutionary debunking arguments. Noûs, 45(1), 103–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sage, J. (2004). Truth-reliability and the evolution of human cognitive faculties. Philosophical Studies, 117(1–2), 95–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stich, S. (2011). Collected papers (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, P. (1995). Evolutionary epistemology and scientific realism. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems, 18(2), 165–191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: the best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43(1–2), 99–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fabio Sterpetti.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sterpetti, F. Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?. Philosophia 43, 877–889 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9608-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9608-4

Keywords

Navigation