Abstract
Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”(SFAs), we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up to their SFAs. In response, Kane has said they do so freely by meeting compatibilist criteria of freedom. In Free Will and Luck (2006), Mele argues that this move is deeply problematic. In this essay, I defend Kane's position. In doing so, I clarify important differences between the SFAs of adults and those of young children, making more clear the connections between SFAs, character, and responsibility.
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Notes
Kane appeals to such arguments from analogy in various writings. See, for instance, Kane (2002, p.418 and 2007a, p.27).
For a discussion of these three criticisms from Ekstrom, Clarke, and Levy, and a way to answer them with a modified Kanean view, see Lemos (2011b).
For explanation and critique of Griffith’s essay, see Lemos (2011a).
See Kane (2007b, pp.174–175 and 2011, p.399).
Kane has made similar remarks on why children bear little responsibility for their first SFAs. Again, see Kane (2007b and 2011).
See Kane (2007b, pp.173-174).
See, for instance, Kane (2011, pp.382–383). See also Kane (2011, note 14, p.404), where he again acknowledges the value of compatibilist freedom and says it plays a significant role in making sense of incompatibilist freedom. He states:
…incompatibilist freedom and control presuppose compatibilist freedom and control. We cannot get to incompatibilist freedom in one fell swoop in the real world. That is one leap too far. We must get there step wise, by exercising compatibilist guidance control over cognitive processes aimed at making choices…(2011, n.14, p.404).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to the point I make in this paragraph. I would also note that reflections on the practices of wise parents can be brought in here to provide additional support for this point. The wise parent realizes that it is a mistake to never hold a child responsible for these earliest choices. Offering very mild punishments for these wrong choices offers incentive for the child to endorse the proper motive in future situations. As Aristotle was well aware, responsibility for character is a function not only of the efforts of the individual but also of the way in which she is raised.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for providing various thoughtful comments and advice that has helped me in making improvements to this article.
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Lemos, J. Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility. Philosophia 43, 135–146 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9561-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9561-7