Abstract
Recently, a new problem has arisen for an Anscombean conception of intentional action. The claim is that the Anscombean’s emphasis on the formally causal character of practical knowledge precludes distinguishing between an aim and a merely foreseen side effect. I propose a solution to this problem: the difference between aim and side effect should be understood in terms of the familiar Anscombean distinction between acting intentionally and the intention with which one acts. I also argue that this solution has advantages over an alternative that has already been endorsed in the literature: it is a better fit for the Anscombean theory, and it naturally accommodates intuitions about the moral significance of aiming vs. merely foreseeing.
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Notes
Paul (p. 11) rightly insists that the difference is”at bottom a metaphysical one.” While the implications for the doctrine of double effect make the problem especially poignant, there would be an interesting challenge here even if we had very good reason to reject any moral significance in the difference between aim and side effect.
Of course, nothing at all turns on the labels here. I choose ‘incidentalism’ for this view because it treats merely foreseen side effects as incidental – they accompany the intentional action, but they do not mark it as intentional. I choose ‘intentionalism’ for the view I endorse because it is the view that descriptions of foreseen side effects do mark the action as intentional.
Paul does not ignore this option, but she only considers one (somewhat implausible) version. I will propose a different version in section 3.
There is a separately describable sensation that tells him there is poison in the water – the sensation of seeing someone else poor the contents of a vial into the well, say – but (i) this is different, and (ii) the same goes for Murderous Gardener.
Cf. Paul (p. 7) “More precisely, what happens will amount to an intentional action under all and only those further descriptions the agent is in a position to offer in answer to the ‘Why?’ question without appeal to observation of what he is doing.” This reading is mistaken in at least two ways: (1) the relevant set of descriptions are those that feature in the questions, not in the answers (and, as I will argue in sections 3 and 4, these sets are not identical); (2) as I mention in the text, citing a mental cause does not involve an appeal to observation, but neither does it qualify as admitting the ‘Why?’ question application.
I would also prefer to say that it is the presence of the poison, rather then each gardener’s knowledge of that state of affairs, that is, or is not, treated as a reason. But this correction is not important for my purposes here.
Though Paul (p. 14) emphasizes the fact that Indifferent Gardener has an answer to “Why are you poisoning,” she also seems to slide back into version (C) from time to time. For example, she considers (p. 13), on the Anscombean’s behalf, whether the presence of the poison is among the considerations that provide Indifferent Gardener with “…a sufficient basis for operating the pump handle.” See also, supra note 4.
If the reader still doubts that this answer gives a reason for acting, I encourage her to consider that (1) no one would doubt that “In order to earn my salary” gives a reason if the question is “Why are you refilling the cistern?” and (2) describing the action as a poisoning rather than a refilling does not change the fact that it is a means to earning his pay (as I argued in considering version (B)).
Admittedly, matters are complicated here by the fact that Anscombe herself, in considering the very same case (p. 42), denies that the ‘Why?’ question applies. But this, it seems to me, is a mistake by her own lights. She says it would be “incorrect, by our criteria, to say that this act of replenishing the house water supply with poisoned water was intentional.” But, as I have been arguing, her criteria in fact suggest just the opposite, and she does not explain herself further. Later (p. 89), she characterizes actions like Indifferent Gardener’s poisoning the inhabitants as voluntary rather than intentional, again insisting that the ‘Why?’ question is refused application. But again, these comments get no support from her earlier discussion. The case for the ‘Why?’ question’s not applying to Indifferent Gardener’s poisoning the inhabitants ought to be made in the initial characterization of the special sense of the question, but it is not. In the absence of some special explanation then, the move seems at best ad hoc. The most natural explanation to read into the text here is the one I reject above, but even if we ignore my arguments, this line would not be available to Anscombe since she is very clear that “for no reason” is not an answer that refuses the question application (p. 25). For these reasons, I do not think that what she says in these few brief excerpts is compatible with the rest of her theory. I think she should have said what I say in the next section, and I think there are plenty of resources in her theory to make it work. However, I am most interested in defending the core of the Anscombean view from Paul’s charge, and if it turns out that the surviving view is one that Anscombe herself would not have wholly endorsed, I can live with that.
In light of my quick rejection of incidentalism version (A), one might expect this strategy to likewise insist upon a solution rather than provide one. But in what follows, I do more than merely insist that Murderous Gardener does, and Indifference Gardener does not, act with the intention of poisoning the inhabitants; I give an account (in terms of the notion of taking something as one’s reason for acting) that is compatible with the Anscombean theory.
I use “the fact that” loosely here. What is important is that the agent takes it to be the case, not that it is in fact the case.
I take this comment to be in keeping with the distinction that T.M. Scanlon draws between the “deliberative” and “critical” applications of moral principles in his (2008, pp. 8–36), though he frames his discussion as a rejection of double effect.
For a similar focus, see McDowell (2010).
Or perhaps simply interpret this to mean…
I have taken some license in recreating the argument this way, but this was unavoidable where Thompson uses locutions such as “…it is hard to see why we shouldn’t say…” and “Why not?” (p. 108). In the following few pages, Thomson adds some detail to the argument in anticipation of a skeptical reply, but those comments are irrelevant for the purposes of my discussion.
I do not wish to weigh in here on whether there are such things as basic actions, nor on how they are best understood. For some interesting discussion, see Alvarez and Hyman (1998); Davidson (2001); McCann (1974). However, I do want to mention that one ought not to be mislead by the fact that these diagrams have left-most descriptions into thinking that this aspect of the Anscombean view comes with commitments one way or the other.
Anscombe (p. 47) also considers a variation on the linear form, but not the one I consider here. We might say that hers branches to the right, while mine branches to the left.
She characterizes this commitment at (pp. 5–6, 9) and the restrictions that she thinks follow at (p. 20).
This is a slight overstatement. I still take it to be a requirement of the Anscombean view that an agent have practical knowledge of the intention with which she acts. But there are no restrictions of the sort that would make Paul’s point.
Thus, Paul’s argument (p. 12) that merely adding the world-to-mind direction of fit does not solve the problem for the Anscombean view only applies to the incidentalist variety.
I owe a great deal of thanks to Jonathan Dancy for many conversations in the early and middle stages of developing this paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments.
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Davey, S. How to Respond to the Problem of Deviant Formal Causation. Philosophia 41, 703–717 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9398-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9398-x