Philosophia

, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 75–97

Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning

Authors

    • Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
    • Faculty of Philosophy, University of Hradec Králové
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8

Cite this article as:
Peregrin, J. Philosophia (2012) 40: 75. doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8

Abstract

There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom.

Keywords

MeaningNormativityInferentialism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010