Abstract
According to the Particularist Theory of Events, events are real things that have a spatiotemporal location. I argue that some events do not have a spatial location in the sense required by the theory. These events are ordinary, nonmental events like Smith’s investigating the murder and Carol’s putting her coat on the chair. I discuss the significance of these counterexamples for the theory.
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Notes
Cleland (1996) says that sounds such as shrieks and bangs are events and that there is a possible world in which they do not have a spatial location. The world is P. F. Strawson’s No-Space world (in 1959). I do not know whether to count them as counterexamples in part because it is not clear to me what sounds in Strawson’s No-Space world are.
An anonymous referee noted that (12) could mean either of the following: I bought an antique that was at the flea market when I bought it. I bought an antique and I was at the flea market when I bought it. I agree. But I think that it can also mean that the action of buying the antique, the transaction, took place at the flea market.
An anonymous referee called my attention to this objection.
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Price, M.S. Particularism and the Spatial Location of Events. Philosophia 36, 129–140 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9075-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9075-7