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Who Cares About Procedural Fairness? An Experimental Approach to Support for Village Elections

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Abstract

After roughly two decades of village elections, to what extent are high quality local elections consolidated in rural China? While attitudinal and behavioral evidence tell a mixed story, this paper leverages experimental data to understand how the procedural quality of village elections, specifically the methods used to nominate candidates, affects support for elections in rural China. After establishing that procedural fairness has a significant effect on whether villagers support village elections, we explore why this is the case. Using democratic consolidation as an analogy, we explore both instrumental and intrinsic motivations for procedural fairness. Some types of people – namely farmers and wealthy villagers, may value procedural fairness for ego-tropic, instrumental reasons. Alternatively, some may value procedurally fair elections for the expected collective outcomes, such as increased public goods provision. Finally, some individuals likely appreciate procedural fairness as an inherent good. We assess each motivation by interacting nomination procedures with measures of profession, income, village level public goods provision and egalitarian core values. With the exception of farmers, each interaction is significant, suggesting that multiple constituencies value high quality village elections in the countryside, likely, for diverse reasons.

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Notes

  1. We use comparative democratic consolidation only as an analogy to help inform the different reasons [78–80] villagers may have for valuing procedurally fair village elections. Democracy is an essentially contested concept (e.g.; [79]), and especially takes on multiple meanings across contexts. Exploring consolidation of grassroots democracy in China would thus stretch the concept of democracy (see [80] for a discussion of conceptual stretching of democracy). For this reason, this paper focuses on one procedural aspect of democracy – open nomination procedures – and asks whether these procedures are accepted and supported by villagers.

  2. This is [36] 26) conception of consolidation.

  3. Indeed, the original and primary opponents to village elections were unelected leaders at the village level ([27, 42], 136–137; [12]), and township governments and village party branch secretaries continue to threaten the autonomy of elected village leaders ([81], 369–373; [13]). However, township governments can also support village elections. For a discussion, see He [7]. Rural Democracy in China: The role of village elections. Macmillan. Additionally, the adversarial relationship between party branch secretaries and village committees may be changing, as elections for party branch secretaries, as well as concurrent office holding, are becoming more common [82].

  4. For a very thorough review of the literature on Chinese Village elections, see Schubert & Ahlers [83]. Participation and empowerment at the grassroots: Chinese village elections in perspective. Lexington Books, Chapter 4.

  5. Based on survey data collected in 2000 in Jiangsu Province, among a random sample of 1260 households. Results were based on responses to three items, asking participants to assess the fairness and transparency of village elections, as well as the extent to which villagers affect decision making.

  6. The Zweig and Fung study was conducted in 1999 in Anhui and Heilongjiang provinces among 2400 villagers, while Tan and Xin conducted surveys in Anhui in 2003, with a sample size of 1299 villagers and 299 cadres.

  7. He [7] draws upon survey data, conducted among 1245 respondents, from Zhejiang province.

  8. Zhong and Chen’s results are based on surveys conducted in 12 counties in Jiangsu Province, among 1270 respondents, in the summer of 2000.

  9. Based on interviews conducted in 1990–1991, among a nationally representative sample of 2896 respondents.

  10. This observation was based on fieldwork conducted in 1992 in Liaoning and Fujian Provinces.

  11. Oi further qualifies the relationship between wealth and participation, arguing that participation depends upon the source of village wealth [13], and that, regardless of villager participation, wealthier villages are most likely to be controlled by higher levels of government [84].

  12. Based on an experimental study conducted among 846 undergraduates at several universities in Tianjin, China in 2007.

  13. These results are based upon surveys conducted in 34 villages in Shaanxi Province in 2000, using a mulit-stage, random sample of both villagers and cadres.

  14. Support for democracy is measured with an index comprised of three measures, perceptions of election fairness, satisfaction with elections, and evaluation of the importance of elections.

  15. The research design addresses two major issues in previous research – first the reliance on observational studies and attending inability of these studies to establish causality (see [5], 28), as well as the reliance on data from one province or region (for a discussion, see [6], 484).

  16. Also known as haixuan or “open sea” elections. Under this process, any eligible voter may nominate a candidate to stand in the election.

  17. Sarsfield and Echegaray [37] refer to this as the axiological rationale.

  18. Proponents had no intention for village elections to lead to broader democracy in China. Rather, their intent was to improve governance and policy implementation in the countryside. For more, see White [38].

  19. More specifically, in response to the first item, “‘If the existing cadres are capable and trusted, there is no need for democratic elections,’ 12% agreed strongly and 24% agreed somewhat; yet 33% disagreed somewhat and 22% disagreed strongly (9% didn’t know or had no response).” With respect to the second item, “‘As long as village economic development is stable, there is no need to increase the level of democracy’, 33% strongly disagreed and 32% disagreed somewhat. Only 7% agreed strongly, while 14% agreed somewhat (14% didn’t know)” (33).

  20. Some studies have shown relationships between core values and political preferences to be reciprocal and not directly causal.

  21. See Article 5 of the Organic Law on Villagers Committees. http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm.

  22. Does this logic apply to a point in time village election, conducted in the broader context of an authoritarian regime? Several studies indicate that procedurally fair elections can lead to more accountability, wherein villagers are able to hold elected villagers accountable [14, 81]. Additionally, if villagers experience fair election procedures once, they are likely to demand procedural fairness in future elections as well. For this reason, wealthy villagers likely perceive electoral procedural fairness in a given election to pose a long rather than short term constraint on elected officials.

  23. Given the experimental design of this study, in which a respondent only sees one version of the scenario (either open or party branch nominations), it would be very difficult and unlikely for respondents to be giving insincere or socially acceptable responses.

  24. In rural China, funds for some public goods, such as schools, are provided at the township or county levels. Thus, village leaders manage rather than provide public schools. For this reason, we refer to both public goods provision and services implementation.

  25. Specifically, studies were conducted in Tianjin, Hebei, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Sichuan, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Hubei and Chongqing.

  26. Hypothetical scenarios are commonly used in procedural justice research and are similar to vignettes, in which a subject reads a story about another person. For examples of studies using hypothetical scenarios and vignettes, both within and outside the study of procedural justice, see the following: [33, 85–88].

  27. While the meaningfulness of the outcome is reduced in scenarios C and D, given that the candidates were selected by the party branch secretary, this will not affect the present investigation for several reasons. First, it is plausible, that once a slate of candidates is set by the party branch secretary, voters select a favorite among the selectorate’s slate. Additionally, the theoretical interest in the present study is the direct and conditioning effects of open nomination procedures, not whether a respondent’s hypothetical preferred candidate was selected.

  28. The occupational breakdown of the sample, as well as descriptive statistics for each of the interacted individual variables (status as farmer, income, and egalitarian core values) are included in Appendix B.

  29. The items were summed and then divided by three. The items load on a single factor in a principal components analysis.

  30. However, research in the Chinese countryside suggests a non-linear relationship with income, wherein middle-income households demonstrate the highest support for village democracy. We also tested this possibility (see Appendix C for results with a squared income term), and found this to also be significant, at slightly lower p values than Model 3 (p = .019 compared to p = .044).

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Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Carrier Currier, Gregory Love, Kristen Parrish, Jim Zink and anonymous reviewers who have provided helpful feedback.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, California State University, 400 W. 1st St, Chico, CA, 95926, USA

    Jennifer R. Wilking

  2. School of Public Affairs, Xiamen University, Xiamen, People’s Republic of China

    Guang Zhang

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Correspondence to Jennifer R. Wilking.

Appendices

Appendix A – Treatment Schematic

 

Positive electoral outcome

Negative electoral outcome

Procedural Characteristic is present (e.g. open nomination)

A

B

Procedural characteristic is absent (e.g. nomination by PB Secretary)

C

D

Appendix B – Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 Occupation of respondents
Full size table
Table 4 Annual household income
Full size table

Measures for Egalitarian Core Values Index

Table 5 Equal opportunity to succeed
Full size table
Table 6 Equal chance
Full size table
Table 7 Equal treatment
Full size table

Appendix C – Additional Analysis

Income squared*open nomination

Open Nominations

2.18 (.3)**

Open Nominations*Income2

.04 (.02)*

Income2

-.01 (.01)

Male

-.19 (.19)

Age

.11 (.09)

Education

.03 (.12)

Constant

3.92 (.5)**

N

486

R2

.28

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Wilking, J.R., Zhang, G. Who Cares About Procedural Fairness? An Experimental Approach to Support for Village Elections. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 23, 177–198 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-016-9451-x

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