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Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy

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Abstract

This article addresses Chinas multilateral diplomacy by identifying four distinct strategies: watching, engaging, circumventing, and shaping. The typology builds on two literatures: power transition theory, and the more recent “assertiveness” discourse in the West. Drawing from a range of cases in both the economic and security domains, the article argues that China’s multilateralism is diverse, and that it cannot be un-problematically characterized as either status-quo or revisionist in nature. However, the general trend appears to be towards engagement, but with an assertive tact as China’s interests become further entangled in the business of international institutions.

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Notes

  1. Note that we are not using the term “institutions” in the sense of constitutive norms, such as sovereignty, democracy, nationalism, equality, and so forth—what English School theorists term “primary institutions.” See: Barry Buzan [2], and Qin Yaqing [3]. The reason is that our focus is on multilateral diplomacy, not norms per se.

  2. See, e.g., A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler [4], Randall L. Schweller [5], and Robert Gilpin [6].

  3. Johnston [7]; Avery Goldstein [8]; John Mearsheimer [9].

  4. For instance, Lanxin Xiang has argued that China’s strict interpretation of the norm of sovereignty was not revisionist, but rather a reaffirmation of the Westphalian principles that undergird the UN Charter. In response, David Shambaugh contended that an impetus for intervention had become the “norm” among Western states in the 1990s, and that China was revisionist in the sense of bucking this trend. Our understanding of revisionism, in terms of either circumventing or shaping, follows Xiang’s, which we feel better reflects the meaning of revisionism as postulated by theorists such as Gilpin, Organski, and Kugler. See: Lanxin Xiang [10], and David Shambaugh [11].

  5. For a discussion, see: Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 8–12.

  6. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 49.

  7. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg. 401.

  8. For instance, John Pomfret opined that, “China’s increasingly anti-Western tone” casts doubt on the “long-held assumption…that a more powerful and prosperous China would be more positively inclined toward Western values and systems.” John Pomfret [14].

  9. Christopher Hughes [15]. See also: Gilbert Rozman [16].

  10. In particular, Shambaugh identifies six schools of thought within China’s discourse community, ranging from a relatively bellicose realpolitik camp to more conciliatory “selective multilateralists.” See: David Shambaugh [18].

  11. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 1.

  12. For instance, even though Wen Jiabao has rejected the idea of a globally-applicable “Chinese model,” he has said that, “All countries have to learn from other countries’ experience in development. At the same time, they have to follow a path suited to their own national conditions and based on the reality of their own countries.” Such language is not particularly assertive, but revisionist in its implicit rejection of prescriptive growth models. See: “Full Text of Chinese Premier’s Press Conference in Egypt,” [20].

  13. See, e.g., Christopher R. Hughes [22]; Avery Goldstein [23]; Hongying Wang [24]; Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel [25]; Marc Lanteigne [26]; Thomas G. Moore [27]; Kuik Cheng-Chwee [28].

  14. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 8–12.

  15. Ibid., 12–25.

  16. Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?” 18–9.

  17. Rozman, “Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” 313.

  18. Alastair Iain Johnston [34]; see also: Alastair Iain Johnston [35], and Ann Kent [36].

  19. Robert Keohane [39]; Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal [40].

  20. Eli Ratner, Naazneen Barma, Steven Weber and Giacomo Chiozza [42]; see also: Naazneen Barma, Eli Ratner and Steven Weber [43].

  21. See, respectively, “Brazil, Germany and India: Draft Resolution,” UN General Assembly Document A/60/L.46, January 9, 2006, available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0106gfour.pdf and “Uniting for Consensus” Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly,’ U.N. Press Release GA/10371, January 26, 2005, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10371.doc.htm.

  22. Ibid., 328–329; see also: Samuel S. Kim [46]. Chu Shulong similarly attributes China’s passive orientation to its desire better to understand how the institution operated. Chu Shulong [47].

  23. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, 205–207.

  24. Johnston, Social States, 24–5.

  25. Anonymous blog entry, “Qianxi woguo heping jiejue guoji zhengduan de lilun yu shijian” (“On the Theory and Practice of China’s Settlement of International Disputes”), available at: http://www.ttzyw.com/Department/she/lkio/200908/53671.html.

  26. For a summary of China’s foreign policy changes in the 1980s see, e.g., Michael Yahuda [48].

  27. In a speech to the General Assembly in October 1991, Qian Qichen, China’s foreign minister, said that, “In the future as always, China will strictly observe the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, earnestly perform its duties, and together with the vast number of member states will actively support the work of the United Nations.” “Qian Qichen Addresses UN General Assembly,” [49].

  28. China’s first participation in a PKO was in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989, in which it allocated 20 personnel.

  29. China also abstained on the 1990 resolution permitting the U.S. use of force in Iraq. Data on PKOs is readily available through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp. Data on the frequency of UN sanctions meetings have been compiled by the Global Policy Forum, and are available online, at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/sanctions-committees-meetings.html. Detailed information on sanctions can be found on the Security Council’s website: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/.

  30. See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Full Text of UN Permanent Five Summit Document,’ November 15, 2000, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2594/2602/t15216.htm.

  31. See: Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small [51] and Joel Wuthnow [52].

  32. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy,” 851. Eric Voeten argues that the ability of a superpower to threaten outside action increases its bargaining leverage in multilateral discussions, but that, given the veto power of other states, the superpower is unlikely to achieve its ideal point. Eric Voeten [53]. The phrase “collective legitimization” was first used by Inis Claude. See: Inis Claude [54].

  33. Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy,” 844–7; Shambaugh, “China or America: Which is the Revisionist Power?” 28; Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans [55]; Michael D. Swaine and Ashley Tellis [56].

  34. For instance, John Ikenberry has written that: "Indeed, what is striking about Asia is silence on the big questions. This is clearly the case with China, which has been quietly working with and within existing frameworks of global cooperation. Arguably, over the last 7 years, it is the US—not China—that has been most “revisionist” in its global orientation. China is more worried that the US will abandon its commitment to the old, Western-oriented global rules and institutions than it is eager to advance a new set of Asian-generated rules and institutions. G. John Ikenberry [57]; see also, Xiang, “Washington’s Misguided China Policy,” 7–24.

  35. Specifically, Sudan is a major oil exporter to the PRC, while Zimbabwe, along with South Africa, supplies platinum and iron ore. On Africa, see: Jonathan Holslag [58], Dennis M. Tull [59].

  36. J. Mohan Malik [60]. One of the seven “principles” of Security Council reform that China supports is “broad consensus,” which seems particularly infeasible. It also opposes a “time limit” for reform, or a forced vote on a non-consensus proposal. See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms,” June 7, 2005, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2594/2602/t199318.htm.

  37. Ibid., 729.

  38. Ibid., 753.

  39. Jing Chen [63]; also see, Yang Jingde, “Lianheguo renquan lishihui gongzuozu shunli jieshu dui Zhongguo renquan shenyi,” (“UN Human Rights Council Finishes its Review of China’s Human Rights”), Xinhua, February 14, 2009, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-02/14/content_10820263.htm.

  40. Ibid., 75.

  41. Ibid., 74.

  42. See: Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, “China Foils U.S. Anti-China Bid on Human Rights,” April 16, 2004, available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng//zt/zgrq/t85437.htm.

  43. Michael J. Dennis [65]; also see, “Who Will Condemn China?”, The Economist, March 24, 2001, 23.

  44. Ibid., 285

  45. See: “Riches in the Near Abroad,” The Economist, January 28, 2010.

  46. Ibid.

  47. Chufang Lin, “Zhongguo yu Baguo Jituan you yue” (“China and the G8 have an Appointement”), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), May 15, 2003. Available at: http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200305150014.htm

  48. Mingjiang Li, “Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations”, RSIS Working Paper No. 225, 2011.

  49. Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Global Economics Paper No. 66, Goldman Sachs, 2001. Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global Economics Paper No. 99, Goldman Sachs, 2003.

  50. See: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, “BRIC Finance Ministers Communique,” August 11, 2008, available at: http://www.minfin.ru/en/news/index.php?id4=6765

  51. Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, “Europe’s Role in Global Economic Governance”, East Asian Forum, 26 July 2011, available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/26/europes-role-in-global-economic-governance/

  52. See: “G-20 Backs Sustained Crisis Response, Shift in IMF Representation”, IMF Survey online, September 25, 2009, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW092509A.htm.

  53. Glosny, “China and the BRICs,” 114.

  54. See: Chris Buckley, “Much-Trumpeted BRIC Summit Ends Quietl”, Reuters, June 17, 2009, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/17/us-bric-summit-idUSTRE55G20B20090617.

  55. See: “China Reassures on Dollar Debate before G8,” China Daily, July 6, 2009, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-07/06/content_8381924.htm.

  56. See: David Arase [73] and Mikael Weissmann [74].

  57. A recent example of the potential efficacy of social influence on China concerned its shifting position on the question of implementing a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. China arguably played an active role in urging the Khartoum government to approve the UN mission only after it had come under pressure from other states and actors, and yielded to protect its reputation as a “responsible stakeholder” in advance of the 2008 Olympics. Jonathan Holslag [75].

  58. See n19 above.

  59. See: Joshua Cooper Ramo [76]; Gu et al., “Global Governance and Developing Countries,” 274–292; and Wang Guangqian, “Zhongguo jueqi: ‘Beijing Gongshi’ yu ‘Beijing Moshi,’” (The Rise of China: “Beijing Consensus” and “China Model,”), Caimao Jingji [Finance and Trade Economics] 2 (2008). Note that Chinese officials, thus far, have demurred from advancing the “Beijing Consensus” as an alternative to Western prescriptions for economic growth.

  60. See, e.g., Speech by Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the Confederation of Indian Industry, Bangalore, January 17, 2007, available at: http://ukingermany.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=Speech&id=4616109.

  61. For a discussion, see: Joel Wuthnow [77].

  62. This perspective, which is that China will become more assertive as its interests dictate, is commensurate with what David Shambaugh terms the “selective engagement” school within the Chinese strategic studies community. Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” 17–20.

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Acknowledgments

Xin Li thanks the Danish EAC Foundation for its financial support for his stay and research at Copenhagen Business School after his completion of PhD education.

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  1. CNA China Studies, Alexandria, VA, USA

    Joel Wuthnow

  2. Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Xin Li

  3. School of Government, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

    Lingling Qi

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Wuthnow, J., Li, X. & Qi, L. Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 17, 269–290 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-012-9202-6

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