Abstract
The objective of this paper is to determine the managerial governance characteristics related to financial distress companies. The boards failed to accomplish their monitoring duties, which seemed to be one of the main reasons behind the actual financial distress and bankruptcy that swept the companies across the planet. Through the analysis of a sample of 178 Lebanese non listed and owned family firms, the results showed that the boards (that have a higher proportion of outside directors) are less inclined to face a financial distress than the boards with a lower proportion. Besides, a different conclusion proves that the board’s size and financial distress are directly linked. The paper highlights the extent to which financial distress is associated with corporate governance from a Euro Mediterranean country. It would be a source of education to Lebanese investors who excessively go for short-term returns and of help for regulatory authorities in the framework of making policies on corporate governance reformation.
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Salloum, C.C., Azoury, N.M. & Azzi, T.M. Board of directors’ effects on financial distress evidence of family owned businesses in Lebanon. Int Entrep Manag J 9, 59–75 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-011-0209-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-011-0209-9