Abstract
A definition of xenophobia is provided. It is argued that basic economics may produce a general theory of it, and that a basic tenet of behavioural economics, i.e. risk aversion, may explain an important class of specific cases of xenophobia. A typical persona oeconomica is risk-averse, hence s/he will fear the changes in social norms that an influx of alien people will induce. Social norms are ubiquitous, yet their relevance and the matters they refer to may be very different; hence a general theory of xenophobia may explain specific cases only to a limited degree. Another possible explanation, based on evolutionary biology, is rejected on empirical bases.
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Notes
For a debate, see Boulding et al. (1978).
For a further discussion See Ortona (2001, in Italian), and the literature in English quoted therein.
The definition requires less than the full acceptance of EUT, because no restriction is imposed on the nature of the weights, nor on the relation between probabilities and outcomes.
Behavioural economics departs from ordinary economics as the former accepts as given some behavioural constants, provided by empirical observation but not theoretically justified on economic grounds. Examples are endowment effect, prospect utility theory, relevance of sunk costs, etc. Obviously, the assumption of risk aversion has been introduced in economics long before the birth of behavioural economics; yet it is behavioural, because the basic assumptions that establish the possibility for a person to make a choice do not imply it.
Other cases are discussed, and explained on the same theoretical basis, in Ortona (2001). They are based on the theories of groups, of club goods, of statistical discrimination, of positional goods and of the caste equilibrium.
See Smith 1982.
It may be of use to recall that a conjecture is not a proved conclusion, but nevertheless is something more powerful than a hypothesis: it is a hypothesis that looks probable on the basis of the available knowledge.
Muller-Benedict (2002) provides further support for the argument of this paragraph through simulation in an artificial society.
See Knez (1998).
The opposite may be true for specific and limited groups. For instance, the leaders of juvenile gangs may want to obtain visibility defying traditional values. They will consequently engage in racist acts just because racism is rejected by mainstream values. A further discussion is in Ortona (2001).
This tendency has been dramatically confirmed by the first round of presidential election of 2016 (this paper has been sent for publication before the second one). However, It is more interesting to consider the pre-crisis period.
Eurostat, 2007; figures for GNP are at PPP.
Bowles and Gintis (2004) shows that a general market equilibrium is not inconsistent with the persistence of outgroup discrimination.
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Ortona, G. Xenophobia is really that: a (rational) fear of the stranger. Mind Soc 16, 37–49 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-016-0190-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-016-0190-7