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Inference from the best systematization

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Abstract

In recent decades “inference to the best explanation” has become a fashionable mode of reasoning. It is, however, highly problematic and flawed in ways that the article expounds. Instead, so it is argued, a process of inference from (not to) the best systematization of the relevant determinable facts is a far more plausible and promising procedure.

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Notes

  1. The idea was originated by C. S. Peirce was launched on its career in this particular terminological guise in Harman (1965), and subsequently developed in his book Harman (1973). Its rationale is given fuller articulation by Harman (1966); and also in Harman (1968). The theory was criticized in Lehrer (1974). Its philosophy of science applications were discussed in Thagard (1978). A general survey of the terrain is Lipton (1991). See also Stadler (2004).

  2. For criticisms of ITTBE in the mode of “inference to the likeliest cause” see Lipton, op. cit., Chap 4. See also Cartwright (1983).

  3. Simplicity is the focus of an enormous literature in recent epistemology and philosophy of science and involves a hornet’s nest of issues, if only because of its multitude of components. One theory can be simpler than another is that is easier to learn, easier to state, easier to apply, easier to work with (computational facility), and so onwards.

  4. On these issues see Rescher (1979).

  5. As far as I know, this approach was first formulated by Max Black as a (mis-?-) interpretation of Popperianism: “Those who agree [with Popper] would rewrite putatively inductive inferences to make them appear explicitly as [optimal] hypothetical explanations of given facts.” (Art. “Induction” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by P. Edwards, Vol. 8, New York, 1967, p. 173.)

References

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Correspondence to Nicholas Rescher.

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Rescher, N. Inference from the best systematization. Mind Soc 15, 147–154 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0186-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0186-8

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