Abstract
Theorists of rational decision act as though probabilities were ubiquitously available for virtually every sort of possible eventuations. As they see it, the existence of probabilities is cost-free and ever-practicable. The present paper argues that—and illustrates how—this supposition can be mistaken. It shows that the postulation of probabilities can have substantive implications that can transform decision issues into something quite different from their initial situation.
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Rescher, N. Probabilities as potentially problematic. Mind Soc 15, 27–32 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0161-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0161-4