Abstract
Recently, Wang et al. analyzed the security of two EPC C1–G2 compliant RFID authentication protocols, called RAPLT and \(\textit{SRP}^+\), and proved that these protocols are vulnerable against de-synchronization and secret disclosure attacks. The time complexity of their attacks were \(O(2^{16})\). In addition, they proposed an improved version of \(\textit{SRP}^+\) entitled \(\textit{SRP}^{++}\), for which they claim the security would be \(O(2^{32})\). However, in this letter, we analyze the security of \(\textit{SRP}^{++}\) and show that the complexity of retrieving all secret parameters of a given tag is \(O(2^{16})\), similar to its predecessor protocol.
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This work was supported by Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University under contract number 11541.
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Safkhani, M., Hosseinzadeh, M., Namin, M.E. et al. On the (Im)Possibility of Receiving Security Beyond 2l Using an l-Bit PRNG. Wireless Pers Commun 92, 1591–1597 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3623-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3623-z