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Regulatory Constructivism: Application of Q Methodology in Italy and China

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Abstract

Conventional view holds that beliefs play an important role in the development of regulations but there is little evidence to support this claim. We use Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map out and compare the beliefs of public officers in China and Italy, two countries with contrasting sets of institutions but have both adopted similar ideas about integrated water resource management. We find some similarities and differences in the beliefs of public officers in both countries. In particular, we find that in both countries beliefs on the regulation of water utilities are diverse and fragmented on issues such as ownership structure of water utilities, how water infrastructure development should be funded, and how tariffs should be regulated. Our findings have two implications for theory, methods and practice. First, the Q methodology is a useful tool for systematically mapping out the beliefs of regulators and managers. Second, systematically mapping out beliefs will help facilitate the development of an alternative regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making. This alternative regime can provide substantial benefits such as more efficient rule making, more cost effective enforcement and compliance, and more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of stakeholders.

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Acknowledgments

This paper is jointly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71573151), the Major Program of the National Social Sciences Foundation of China (15ZDB164), National Key Research Program (2016YFC0401408), and Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program (2014z04083). The authors are grateful for the assistance from Ms. Jing-ning Kang. We are also grateful for the comments from anonymous reviewers and the editors. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Eduardo Araral

  2. SOAS, University of London, London, UK

    Alberto Asquer

  3. Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Yahua Wang

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  1. Eduardo Araral
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  2. Alberto Asquer
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  3. Yahua Wang
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Correspondence to Alberto Asquer.

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Araral, E., Asquer, A. & Wang, Y. Regulatory Constructivism: Application of Q Methodology in Italy and China. Water Resour Manage 31, 2497–2521 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1496-2

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