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Argumentative Discussion: The Rationality of What?

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Abstract

Most dialectical models view argumentation as a process of critically testing a standpoint. Further, they assume that what we critically test can be analytically reduced to (1) individual and (2) bi-polar standpoints. I argue that these two assumptions lead to the dominant view of dialectics as a bi-partisan argumentative discussion in which the yes-side (proponent) argues against the doubter or the no-side (opponent). I scrutinise this binary orientation in understanding argumentation by drawing on the main tenets of normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories of argumentation. I develop my argument by showing how argumentative practice challenges these assumptions. I then lay out theoretical reasons for this challenge. This paves the way for an enhanced conceptualisation of dialectical models and their standards of rationality in terms of multi-party discussions, or argumentative polylogues.

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  1. “The original meaning of ‘dialectic’ is discourse or intercourse between two or more speakers expressing two or more positions or opinions” (McKeon 1954: 3). “A dialogue is an extended verbal exchange between two people (in its simplest form), in which the parties take turns responding to what the other said in one or more of the preceding turns” (Blair 1998: 325). “The root meaning of dialectical is dialogue—a logos (which I take to mean ‘reasoned discourse’) that is between two (or more) people” (Johnson 2000: 161).

  2. It seems less straightforward in Walton’s New Dialectic where different types of argumentative dialogue are defined, among other things, by a distinct initial situation. Deliberation, for instance, starts with an open problem and initial positions/proposals for action may not be clearly defined. Eventually, however, the same theoretical move is made: “Deliberation can also involve large groups of agents, and many proposals for action, but the argumentation on any given point reduces to two sides, the pro and the contra” (Walton 2006: 235 n. 4).

  3. “Soc[rates]. Believe me, Phaedrus, I am a lover of these divisions [diairesis] and collections, that I may gain the power to speak and to think; and whenever I deem another man able to discern an objective unity and plurality, I follow in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god… those who have this ability I call dialecticians.” (Plato Phaedrus: 266b, as quoted in Brown 2010: 153–154).

  4. While polar yes/no questions and questions with two contradictory alternatives seem very similar in their semantic substance and pragmatic role (Karttunen 1977), Biezma and Rawlins (2012) analyse fine differences between them, the crucial one being the assumption of exhaustiveness in alternative questions which has the pragmatic effect of “cornering” the addressee.

  5. See above, Sect. 1. An arguer who directly negates the protagonist’s proposition (+/p) mixes her role of a protagonist of the contradictory proposition (−/p) with the role of an antagonist who doubts it (?/(+/p)), since propositional opposition entails doubt that such a positive standpoint can be upheld. The discussion is therefore “mixed”. Please note that while the positive or negative standpoint directly regard an expressed opinion/proposition, doubt is expressed with respect to a positive or negative standpoint, rather than the proposition itself (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 81; I thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this distinction).

  6. According to Schmidtz, “one’s choice is rational only if one did not recognize clearly better reasons for choosing any of one’s forgone alternatives” (1995: 38).

  7. Note that this can also be “translated” into the pragma-dialectical non-mixed dispute: “I really don’t know if the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories is a good idea.” If uttered as a genuine doubt (rather than hedged negation), when accompanied by reasons it would create a “not consistently simple [the early term for ‘non-mixed’] discussion” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 87–89), in the sense that the antagonist merely doubts the main point at issue, but at the same time actively provides arguments for her doubt, including counter-arguments against parts of the protagonist’s (sub-)argumentation.

  8. “In asking a yes-or-no question we are wavering between opposite sentences. […] This opposition or conflict is to be understood in such a way that we ipso facto reject one limb as false when we accept the other as true, and conversely. The rejection of the one and the acceptance of the other are one and the same.” (Frege The early “Logic”, quoted in Rumfitt 2000: 781).

  9. Other dialecticians, such as Walton, clearly hesitate regarding the primary goal of a dialectical “persuasion dialogue”. In the most frequently used formulation, persuasion dialogue is aimed at a “resolution of the initial conflict [of points of view] by verbal means”, that is, by critical testing (Walton and Krabbe 1995: 68). Walton, however, also declares that: “In the new dialectic, the purpose of persuasion dialogue is to increase maieutic insight on an issue” (Walton 1998: 242–243).

  10. Doubt (the “I’m not sure” answer) does not constitute a separate standpoint in need of defence, and therefore does not make the yes/no issues any less binary.

  11. Logically speaking, a side is a set consisting of one element {(p)}, a proposition discussed in relation to its own contradiction {(~p)} (or an empty set {(ø)}). A position is a one-element set {(p)}, consisting of a proposition discussed in relation to other propositions, contrary to it {(q), (r), (s)…(z)}. A case consists not only of a proposition expressed as a standpoint, but rather a standpoint together with its supporting arguments; therefore, a case is a structured set {(p), (a1, a2, a3)}.

  12. Rahwan and Keiff (2005: 360) make similar observations, although they remain within the bounds of formal logical perspective: “The first group [constructivists, game-theoretical logicians] could be characterised as seeking the dialogical (or argumentative) structure of logic. […] The second group [argumentation scholars, game and non-monotonic logicians] could be conversely characterised as seeking the logic—including informal logic—and mathematics of dialogues and argumentation.”

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Mark Aakhus, Dima Mohammed, David Godden and two anonymous reviewers for, let us hope, rational polylogical discussion over earlier drafts of this paper. Work on the paper was supported by two Grants of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT): SFRH/BPD/74541/2010 and PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014.

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    Marcin Lewiński

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Lewiński, M. Argumentative Discussion: The Rationality of What?. Topoi 38, 645–658 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9361-0

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