Abstract
Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s). Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1), most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Sometimes the notions of ‘reasoning’ and ‘argumentation’ will be used interchangeably, primarily because within the context of my project in this essay, they can be used as such without too many problems or confusions. As such, at later points in this essay, reasoning will be understood as being manifested in the form of an argument dialog. It is my hope that the context will make the particular uses of these terms clear. Some further thoughts will also be given as to how we may differentiate these concepts, especially when we look at Aberdein and Walton.
I will assume that playing the game well means that a player is especially competent, apt, and a talented player in that she wins more games than she loses. Furthermore, she doesn’t win by luck, that is, it’s not simply that she just so happens to make good moves that lead to an eventual win, but that she employs strategies with the full intention and aim that her performance is directed at winning.
Grice proposes a short-list of such excellences: clear-headedness, thoroughness, tenacity in argument, flexibility, orderliness, breadth, sense of relevance, intellectual caution, intuitiveness, inventiveness, subtlety, and memory (p. 31 n).
Consider Zagzebski’s sample lists:
Intellectual Virtues
-
The ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail;
-
Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence;
-
Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others;
-
Intellectual humility;
-
Intellectual perseverance, diligence, care, and thoroughness;
-
Adaptability of intellect;
-
The detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts;
-
Being able to recognize reliable authority;
-
Insight into persons, problems, theories;
-
The teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they respond.
Intellectual Skills
-
Verbal skills: skills of speaking and writing;
-
Perceptual acuity skills, e.g., fact-finding skills: these are the skills of the detective or the journalist;
-
Logical skills: skills of performing deductive and inductive reasoning, the ability to think up counterexamples;
-
Explanatory skills, e.g., the ability to think up insightful analogies;
-
Mathematical skills and skills of quantitative reasoning;
-
Spatial reasoning skills, e.g., skills at working puzzles;
-
Mechanical skills, e.g., knowing how to operate and manipulate machines and other physical objects. (p. 114).
-
Furthermore, for any person to attribute the possession of virtues to someone else, the successful exercise of some virtuously motivated skill on their part would seemingly be necessary since our judgments could seemingly only be made as a result of such successful performances.
Some examples of intellectual vices include: “intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, intellectual laziness, lack of thoroughness” (p. 152).
It is interesting that this now opens up the viability of evaluating one’s audience as either virtuous or vicious participants in an argumentative discourse.
It may be that such an ethical aspect might be more characteristic of argumentation than other intellectual activities. For instance, Zagzebski’s virtue approach is geared towards explicating what it is to form beliefs in an intellectually virtuous manner, but any epistemological project may really only focus on the agent who acquires beliefs for herself. Because argumentation is a dialectical activity, it may be the case that when we engage in it we have a greater responsibility to participate in a virtuous manner since others are involved, such as our direct interlocutor as well as his/her interlocutors, than we do in forming beliefs for ourselves.
Daniel Cohen (2005) refers to such arguers as the lost heroes of argumentation. They are not in the practice for their own glory, but for the sake of truth.
In fact, making such errors may be necessary and desirable for any intelligent system. See Gigerenzer (2005).
References
Aristotle. On sophistical refutations (trans: Forster ES). William Heinemann Ltd, London
Aberdein A (2010) Virtue in argument. Argumentation 24:165–179
Cohen DH (2005) Arguments that backfire. In: Hitchcock D, Farr D (eds) The uses of argument. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, Hamilton, pp 58–65
Gigerenzer G (2005) I think, therefore I err. Soc Res 72(1) (Spring): 195–218
Govier T (1983) Who says there are no fallacies? Informal Log 5:2–10
Grice P (2001) Aspects of Reason. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford
Hamblin CL (1970) Fallacies. Vale Press, Newport News
Walton D (2010) Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are. Informal Log 30(2):159–184
Walton D (2011) Defeasible reasoning and informal fallacies. Synthese 179(3):377–407
Whately R (1834; reprint) Elements of logic. University of Michigan Library Reprints, Ann Arbor
Zagzebski L (1996) Virtues of the mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ball, A. Are Fallacies Vices?. Topoi 35, 423–429 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9330-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9330-7