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Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?

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Notes

  1. A very modest sampling might include Varela et al. (1991), Clark (1997), Haugeland (1998), Hurley (1998), Clark and Chalmers (1998), Rowlands (1999), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), O'Regan and Noë (2001), Shapiro (2004), Wilson (2004), Noë (2004), Gallagher (2005), Clark (2008b). For some critiques, see Adams and Aizawa (2001), Grush (2003), Rupert (2004), Adams and Aizawa (2008). It should go without saying that many if not all of the key ideas have longer and much more varied pedigrees. For a brief survey of these historical roots, see Clark (1997, chap. 8, sect. 8).

  2. This paper was first presented at an Academia Sinica meeting in Taipei in 1993. It appeared in a volume following that meeting (Houng and Ho 1995). The version quoted in the present text is the one found in Haugeland (1998).

  3. For a useful overview see Torrance (2005).

  4. Clark (2008, chap. 8, submitted) argues against the existence of extended experiences.

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Acknowledgement

The writing of this paper was supported by the AHRC (Grant Number AH/E511139/1) and forms a part of the CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) Project. The CONTACT project is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme.

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  1. School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK

    Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark

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Correspondence to Julian Kiverstein.

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Kiverstein, J., Clark, A. Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?. Topoi 28, 1–7 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4

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