Theory and Decision

, Volume 79, Issue 4, pp 667–688

An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-015-9483-2

Cite this article as:
Kelsey, D. & le Roux, S. Theory Decis (2015) 79: 667. doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9483-2

Abstract

We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity-safe option. We find that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity-aversion influences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.

Keywords

Ambiguity Choquet expected utility Coordination game  Ellsberg urn Experimental economics 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ExeterExeterEngland
  2. 2.Department of Accounting, Finance & EconomicsOxford Brookes UniversityOxfordEngland