Theory and Decision

, Volume 71, Issue 4, pp 461–472

Making statements and approval voting

Authors

    • Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, C.S.I.C.
  • Itzhak Gilboa
    • Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University
    • Department of Economics and Decision Sciences HEC
  • Andrew Weiss
    • Department of EconomicsBoston University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5

Cite this article as:
Aragones, E., Gilboa, I. & Weiss, A. Theory Decis (2011) 71: 461. doi:10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5
  • 73 Views

Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Keywords

Approval votingTurnout

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010