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Teleology and biocentrism

  • S.I.: Teleological Organisation
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Abstract

In this paper I examine the connection between accounts of biological teleology and the biocentrist claim that all living beings have a good of their own. I first present the background for biocentrists’ appeal to biological teleology. Then I raise a problem of scope for teleology-based biocentrism and, drawing in part on recent work by Basl and Sandler, I discuss Taylor and Varner’s responses to this problem. I then challenge Basl and Sandler’s own response to the scope problem for its reliance on a selectionist account of organismic teleology. Finally I examine the prospects for a biocentrist response to the problem of scope based on an alternative organisational account of internal teleology. I conclude by assessing the prospects for teleology-based biocentrism.

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Notes

  1. Feinberg (1974), a critic of biocentrism, agrees with Taylor and Varner that it is untenable to claim that inanimate artifacts have a good of their own. In contrast, some environmental philosophers endorse the claim that inanimate artifacts have a good of their own, but do not subscribe to biocentrism (Regan 1976, pp. 492–4, Regan 1983, pp. 87–88; Frey 1980, pp. 78–82).

  2. See also Holm (2012).

  3. The guiding idea of synthetic biology is to develop a minimal organism whose genome only codes for the functions necessary for survival and reproduction. This minimal organism can then be used as a “chassis” to construct organisms designed for specific purposes using standard biological parts with specific functions in a way analogous to the way in which mechanical and electronic systems can be built out of hardware in accordance with a set of assembly instructions.

  4. See Boorse (1976), Millikan (1996) and Neander (1996) for discussion of the case of instant organisms in the context of the etiological theory of teleological function. Davidson (1987) contains the Swampman scenario.

  5. Taylor’s distinction between derivative and non-derivative ends is equivalent to the distinction between internal and external teleology to be introduced in Sect. 4.

  6. It is worth noting that identifying a derivative end of an artifact may not be an easy task, because its end may not be deduced from the artifact itself, but requires information about its history, in particular the intentions and goals of its designers.

  7. For a succinct statement of this idea see Neander (1991). Sperber (2007) suggest that on the “classical” understanding of teleological functions, artifact functions are “intended effects”. Other accounts of artifact teleology appealing to agents’ intentions include Houkes and Vermaas (2010), Kroes (2012), McLaughlin (2001), and Millikan (1984).

  8. Thanks to Louisa Holt for valuable discussion of the issues raised in this section.

  9. Let me note that this section is not intended as a defense of the organisational theory of teleology. My aim is to examine the prospects for teleology-based biocentrism on the assumption that the organisational account explains the sense in which organisms are teleological. The aim in this section is simply to introduce the central features of the theory.

  10. This conclusion is controversial. One of the ends of organisms is commonly said to be reproduction. Proponents of the organisational approach are aware of this issue. For discussion see see Saborido et al. (2011).

  11. Let me note that my focus here is on the problem of scope as it arises with respect to the claim that organisms have a good of their own in virtue of their teleological nature. The cases considered may also be considered to be controversial implications of the organisational theory of biological teleology as such.

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Acknowledgements

This paper has undergone substantial revisions. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. Also thanks to Louisa Holt for helpful comments. The research for the paper was supported by a grant from the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF-4180-00146).

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Holm, S. Teleology and biocentrism. Synthese 194, 1075–1087 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1300-0

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