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Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education

  • S.I.: Systematicity - The Nature of Science
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Abstract

This paper explores the relation between scientific knowledge and common sense intuitions as a complement to Hoyningen-Huene’s account of systematicity. On one hand, Hoyningen-Huene embraces continuity between these in his characterization of scientific knowledge as an extension of everyday knowledge, distinguished by an increase in systematicity. On the other, he argues that scientific knowledge often comes to deviate from common sense as science develops. Specifically, he argues that a departure from common sense is a price we may have to pay for increased systematicity. I argue that to clarify the relation between common sense and scientific reasoning, more attention to the cognitive aspects of learning and doing science is needed. As a step in this direction, I explore the potential for cross-fertilization between the discussions about conceptual change in science education and philosophy of science. Particularly, I examine debates on whether common sense intuitions facilitate or impede scientific reasoning. While contending that these debates can balance some of the assumptions made by Hoyningen-Huene, I suggest that a more contextualized version of systematicity theory could supplement cognitive analysis by clarifying important organizational aspects of science.

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Notes

  1. The terms ‘common sense’ and ‘scientific knowledge’ are not strictly defined or used consistently in the book, which may seem problematic (Rowbottom 2013). Whereas Rowbottom calls for insights from social epistemology to illuminate the question about what scientific knowledge is, this paper calls for connections to the literature on science education and cognitive science in clarifying the role of common sense.

  2. For more detailed overviews, see (Zimmerman 2000) and (diSessa forthcoming).

  3. Nersessian’s (1989, 1992) account also emphasize similarities in the cognitive processes in the two contexts, but the development of the two accounts has since gone in different directions (c.f., Gopnik and Glymour 2002; Nersessian 1996, 2002).

  4. diSessa (personal communication) opens for the possibility that the connection to common sense intuitions could be maintained in the final encoding, but systematically suppressed in articulation. The option indicates how it would be difficult to settle this question empirically.

  5. For a more general discussion of influences of prior beliefs on hypothesis testing, reasoning and evaluation of evidence, see (Evans 2002; Stanovich 1999).

  6. In the context of science education, diSessa refers to similar organized couplings of p-prims as “coordination classes”. He however cautions against the image of common sense resources as rigid tools like bricks in a brick-wall (diSessa, personal communication).

  7. A similar criticism has been raised against experimental designs that have been used to support arguments in cognitive science about how common sense notions impede correct inferences about probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Scholars have pointed out that the experiments rely on certain normative assumptions or lack clarity about what the “right” or “rational” answer would be (Carruthers 2002; Gigerenzer 2000). See also (Zimmerman 2000), for a review of different theories and experimental studies.

  8. It should also be noted that science education played important inspirational roles for Kuhn’s work in the late 1950s (Andersen 2012), including the development of his account of examplars in science education.

  9. See (Hoyningen-Huene 2013, p. 208) for a clarification of the difference between history of science and his “systematic philosophy”, and pp. 163–165 for a comparison to Kuhn’s account.

  10. diSessa (personal communication) has later questioned the utility of systematicity based on the problem also in science education that the level of grain and empirical implications of the theory is not sufficiently specified. This concern applies equally to Hoyningen-Huene’s account in the context of both philosophy of science and science education.

  11. However, the current controversy on the evidential status of systematic meta-analysis may also challenge the view that increased systematicity is always a good thing (Stegenga 2011; see also below).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Andrea diSessa, William Bechtel and two anonymous reviewers for extremely useful comments to an earlier version of this paper. Discussions with my colleagues at Department of Science Education on this topic in connection to a ‘Scholarly Friday’ workshop were important for my reflections on the relation between scientific knowledge and common sense. I would also like to thank Karim Bschir, Simon Lohse, and Hasok Chang for editing this special issue.

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  1. Department of Science Education, University of Copenhagen, Øster Voldgade 3, 1350, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Sara Green

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Green, S. Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education. Synthese 196, 795–818 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1276-9

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