Abstract
Both Aristotle and Ernst Mayr present theories of dual explanation in biology, with proximal, clearly physical explanations and more distal, biology-specific explanations. Aristotle’s presentation of final cause explanations in Posterior Analytics (II.11) relates final causes to the necessary material, formal, and efficient causes that mediate them. Johnson (Aristotle on teleology, 2005) and Leunissen (Apeiron 43:117–142, 2010b) demonstrate the problematic nature of historical and recent interpretations and open the door for a new interpretation consistent with modern evolutionary theory. Mayr’s (Science 134:1501–1506, 1961) differentiation of proximate and ultimate/evolutionary causes provides a key to appropriating Aristotle for modern use, if care is taken to differentiate Mayr’s proximate/distal and mechanical/evolutionary distinctions from his intentional/non-intentional distinction. Building on Mayr, and noting his appropriation of ancient and recent commentary, a strong case can be made for nested explanation, wherein evolutionary explanations are instantiated in systems of mechanical explanations. Biological concepts of organism, gene, function, etc., are etiologically prior to mechanical explanations of function, but temporally posterior to mechanical explanations of historical adaptation. Such an analysis sheds light on recent arguments within evolutionary biology while highlighting the importance of epistemology in contemporary science.
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Notes
Syllogisms always include a minor term (A), a middle term (B), and a major term (C) and take this form: Major premise predicating C of B / Minor premise predicating B of A / Conclusion predicating C of A.
Leunissen (2010a) suggests that Aristotle’s gloss of formal cause refers back to an earlier syllogism, but a simpler interpretation refers back to the material cause syllogism that immediately precedes it. One syllogism demonstrates two causes.
Letters and references suggest that Mayr was also influenced by James Lennox and David Balme in his interpretations of Aristotle.
To be clear, Aristotle refers to matter as the first potentiality and the soul—the form of the organismal body—as the second potentiality or first actuality of life (De Anima II.1). The second actuality would be the organism living, or in Aristotle’s terms, the nutritive soul in increase, the sensitive soul in sensing, or the rational soul in reflection. In speaking of life, here, I am referring not just to the soul, but the soul in action. One may debate whether a revivable human or plant seed is more potential or actual, but the thinking human and growing plant have the second actuality.
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Mix, L. Nested explanation in Aristotle and Mayr. Synthese 193, 1817–1832 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0811-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0811-4