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Tolerance and higher-order vagueness

  • S.I. : Vagueness and Probability
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Abstract

The idea of higher-order vagueness is usually associated with conceptions of vagueness that focus on the existence of borderline cases. What sense can be made of it within a conception of vagueness that focuses on tolerance instead? A proposal is offered here. It involves understanding ‘definitely’ not as a sentence operator but as a predicate modifier, and more precisely as an intensifier, that is, an operator that shifts the predicate extension along a scale. This idea is combined with the author’s earlier approach to the semantics of vague expressions, which builds on the idea of a central gap associated with a predicate. The central gap approach is generalized to handle arbitrarily many iterations of ‘definitely’.

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Notes

  1. Two others that are also known: that vague predicates are sorites-susceptible, and that they have no sharp boundaries. The former is a consequence of tolerance. The latter may be seen as resulting from tolerance and the existence of borderline cases together.

  2. The conception of tolerance is due to (Wright 1975, 1976).

  3. Second-order vagueness is not universally accepted. Crispin Wright in several papers (e.g. Wright 2010) and Raffman (2010), as well as (e.g. Bobzien 2010), are critical of the idea of applying ‘definitely’ to borderline. For instance, Raffman (2010), p. 513 argues that if something is definitely \(\Phi \), then failure to classify it as \(\Phi \) is mistaken or improper, while classifying something as borderline \(\Phi \) is always optional, and then judging something to be definitely borderline \(\Phi \) is inconsistent: it must then both be optional and mistaken to judge it to be \(\Phi \).    

       However, what is optional about calling something borderline \(\Phi \) is that it might also be called \(\Phi \) as well as not \(\Phi \), not that it might also be classified as not borderline \(\Phi \). Should something be borderline borderline, then it should be optional as well to classify it as not borderline, but exactly this is ruled out if it is definitely borderline. There is no inconsistency here, as far as I can see.

  4. An alternative idea of higher-order vagueness concerns vagueness in the meta-language, e.g. in a meta-language that contains a truth predicate. I shall not be concerned with that idea here.

  5. This conception, attributed to Russell in the quoted passage, is sometimes called Radical Higher-order Vagueness. The idea is critically scrutinized in a recent paper by Dietz (2015). Discussion of his points must be deferred to another occasion.

  6. As we will see later on, this is not a general recipe, for it does not tell us how to aggregate the status of different individuals with respect to different predicates into the status of a world with respect to a sentence.

  7. He uses ‘\(\Delta \)’ where I use ‘D’. My choice is merely aesthetic.

  8. Cf. Sainsbury (1990, p. 255), Sainsbury (1991, p. 169). Williamson (1999, p. 135), using the predicate example ‘is such that seven is small’, criticises the idea that a predicate for which every case is borderline draws more boundaries than does a predicate for which no case is borderline. I find it hard to see the relevance of the objection, however, since a boundary is drawn to the extent that the condition to be satisfied on the one side is different from the condition to be satisfied on the other side, regardless of how many objects, if any, satisfy them.

    The question when we are justified in distinguishing the conditions is more difficult. It is plausible to say that if the predicates F and G are logically equivalent (e.g. if \(\forall x (Fx \ \leftrightarrow \ Gx)\) is logically true), then the condition of satisfying the one just is the same as the condition of satisfying the other.

  9. I have followed Williamson in using the inductive format.

  10. It should be noted that Williamson is not wholly committed to the validity of B, but discusses reasons for abandoning it Williamson (1999), pp. 137–138. Still, he does assume it.

  11. Fara (2002, p. 136) in fact provides a model with a central gap in a domain of possible worlds, relative to a distance measure between worlds. She calls models that lack such a gap ‘‘stepping-stone’’ models.

  12. This account is presented and elaborated in Pagin (2010, 2011b). Much of the material in this section is taken from the latter.

  13. This can also be regarded as the two-dimensional gap for complex predicates such as ‘is tall and fat’ and ‘is tall or fat’. Cf. the final section.

  14. A weak order \(\lesssim \) over a domain D is a binary relation over D satisfying the conditions

    figure r
  15. With respect to gradable adjectives, the present interpretation of ‘definitely’ takes it to be an intensifier, moving the application conditions along the scale, as does the interpretation of ‘very’. This does not, of course, mean that I take ‘definitely’ to mean the same as ‘very’.

  16. In the literature on higher-order vagueness it is common to treat the definitely operator formally as a sentence operator, but to revert predicate modifier talk informally: saying that an object a definitely F when it is formally a question of a sentence or proposition being definitely true.

  17. I have several times been asked why we need two parameters rather than just one. It is indeed possible to fix a relation between \(\delta \) and \(\epsilon \) so that one is a function of the other. However, I see no reason why any particular relation between \(\delta \) and \(\epsilon \) would be selected either by the meanings of predicate, the meaning of ‘definitely’, or the ideas of vagueness or higher-order vagueness. So fixing a relation would be arbitrary, and thus an unreasonable restriction on the domain of models.

  18. The first intuition, I think, is widely shared, and almost incontrovertible. The second relates to ‘definitely’ in natural language, but to my knowledge has not previously been defended in the vagueness literature.

  19. In fact, we can allow the safety margin to increase without violating (T), provided the safety margin for DF is not greater than the sum of the safety margin and the tolerance for F. If this were to be violated, the B axiom schema will not be valid (see below).

  20. It should be noted, though, that for a predicate like ‘bald’, with an associated discrete order, it is not the case that for any finite set of objects there is a higher-order gap model. That is, Fact 1 does not in general hold for the discrete case.

  21. Note that (RN) means that if F is true of all objects in a domain, so is DF. So-called D-introduction, accepted by Fine (1975, p. 288), and used by Fara (2003) to generate her paradox of higher-order vagueness, is not valid. D-introduction allows us to infer that DF holds of an object if F holds for that object. This is clearly inconsistent with the idea of added (over and above preserved) safety.

    Cobreros (2011a) provides a variant of Fara’s paradox that does not employ D-introduction, but instead relies on arbitrarily iterated definitizations of Fara’s premises. Where Fara has premise \(\phi \), Cobreros has \(D^{n} \phi \), for n as large as is needed (for generating the paradox). The resulting set of premises is indeed unsatisfiable, also by my standards. Any of the premises can be true in a gap model, and none is true in all models. It will depend on the distribution of objects and measures in the particular model. Cobreros (2011a, p. 220) argues that his opponent (any theorist who characterize vagueness in terms borderline cases–which does not include me) is committed to accepting the definitized premises. Maybe that is true, but it is certainly not true of the theorist who defends an intensifier interpretation of ‘definitely’.

  22. A referee draws attention to the fact, pointed out by Williamson (1994, pp. 152–297) that \(\phi \wedge \lnot D \phi \) is globally invalid in supervaluationism. An inference from \(\Gamma \) to \(\phi \) is globally valid iff \(\phi \) is true on all precisifications in case all elements in \(\Gamma \) are true in all precisifications. On a simple supervaluationist interpretation of D, \(D \phi \) is true in a valuation just in case \(\phi \) is true in all precisifications. Under these circumstances, \(\phi \wedge \lnot D \phi \) cannot be true in all precisifications, and is therefore globally inconsistent. Cf. Fine (1975, p. 283), Cobreros (2011b).

  23. It is used in the proof of his Theorem 1. A referee suggests that Fine’s acceptance of commitment to super-definiteness reflects his own acceptance of global validity. Although Fine accepted global validity in 1975, it is hard to see traces of such acceptance in 2008, in which supervaluationism is rejected.

  24. Indeed, on my own account of assertion (Pagin 2011a), an assertion is an utterance that is prima facie informative, i.e. prima facie made because it is true. If the utterance is informative, then the truth of what is asserted may be correctly inferred from the assertion’s having been made. So, prima facie, if you assert that P, you can tell whether P.

  25. Here, if \(\xi \) is a sub-sequence of \(\xi '\), and both are in a set V, the tree corresponding to V does not contain \(\xi \) as a separate branch that ends with a leaf, but is only an initial segment of such a branch.

  26. We shall continue to assume for simplicity that basic scales for simple predicates are upwards directed in the sense that if an object a is in the extension of a predicate F, and object b has a higher value on the relevant scale, then b is in the extension as well. Should we allow the direction to vary, we would include as a third element in the central gap a direction function \({\mathscr {G}}^{d}\), where the values are in \(\{\downarrow , \uparrow \}\).

  27. What I call ‘‘Complex Language’’ (CL), adds conjunction, including conjunction under D. Giving the semantics for CL must be deferred to another occasion.

  28. See Negri (2011, p. 525). We need the restriction that the rule of necessitation is valid only from derivations without assumptions. For some systems of modal logic, weaker restrictions apply.

  29. The failure of K, depending on the decreasing added safety of iterations of D, is sufficient for blocking the impossibility results in Fine (2008).

  30. Mahtani (2008) objects to Williamson’s symmetry assumption. She argues that in Williamson’s framework, ‘definitely’ must itself be seen as vague. The interpretation of ‘definitely’ at a point determines how close another world must be in order that interpretations are indistinguishable. Therefore, the interpretation of a language L at point i might be indistinguishable from the interpretation of L at point j, but not conversely, due to the fact that the interpretation of ‘definitely’ at j is more strict. As far as I can see, this kind of model is perfectly acceptable, but it is also possible to allow for a variation in the strictness of ‘definitely’ that is still consistent with symmetry, as long as the variation is not very steep.

  31. Fara (2003, p. 205) has a related observation, claiming that a set of three objects is enough to demonstrate the possibility of infinite higher-order vagueness without fuzzy boundaries. In her case, the idea is that for any k, ‘\(D^{k}\)tall’ is true of the first object, false of the third, and neither true nor false of the second.

    Somewhat related, too, is Bobzien’s idea (2013, p. 15) columnar higher-order vagueness, in which we only have the original three areas: DF, \(D \lnot F\), and \(\lnot DF \wedge \lnot D \lnot F\); any larger combination of iterations of D and \(\lnot \) will coincide with one of these three.

    Indeed, we get precisely this result in the intensifier framework in case \(\delta (x)=x\) and \(\epsilon (x)=0\): tolerance doesn’t shrink, and safety isn’t added. From the perspective of D as an intensifier, this possibility is not of central importance.

  32. The Higher-order sorites paradox in Zardini (2013) employs a premise called (R) (2013, p. 38, which says ‘‘For every i, ‘\(D^{i}B'\) is definitely\(^{\omega }\) vague’’. Zardini argues for this principle by appeal to epistemic limitations: there is no number n such that we have the capacity to identify sharp boundaries for predicates with n iterations of D. However, (R) is then used to justify premises like Premise 2: ‘‘\(D^{999,999} \lnot \exists x(DDBx \wedge D \lnot DBx')\)’’ (where \(x'\) is the object directly following x in a sorites sequence, 2013, p. 39).

    From the present perspective, this move is illicit. The claim concerning epistemic limitations is correct, for at no finite number of iterations does tolerance reduce to zero. The conclusion drawn, however, Premise 2, requires there to be objects in the domain to fill up the relevant regions. So an extra assumption about the domain of discourse is needed. This assumption is met Zardini’s own case, where the domain is the set of natural numbers between 0 and 1,000,000 Zardini (2013), p. 28. In higher-order Gap models, principles like Premise 2 will be false in case the successor operator \('\) is understood as mapping any (non-final) object in an appropriately ordered sequence on the object that succeeds it. For with suitable gaps, the next object may in fact be not so similar in the relevant measure. If, instead we keep the usual interpretation of \('\) as the natural number successor operation, and the model has gaps, then it will not be defined for every argument.

  33. Fine (2008, p. 114) calls it ‘‘super-definitely’’.

  34. This is in agreement with Williamson (1994, p. 160) (for \(D^{*}\)) and Fine (2008, p. 122). According to Fine, this follows by logical principles when Superdefinitely P is defined (like Williamson’s \(D^{*}\)) as an infinite conjunction (P \( \, \& \, \) Definitely P \( \, \& \, \) ...), because definitely collects over conjunction. Note that the result here, for the tolerance operator, does not depend on using an infinitary formula.

  35. Interestingly, Richard Dietz has suggested that the domain cut for \(D \vee G\) should be formed by from the F and G cuts by removing from the union the parts that stretch beyond the intersection. This means that an object a is \(F \vee G\) if it is F even if borderline G (i.e. in the G domain cut) or G but borderline F. If an object is \(\lnot F\) and borderline G, it is in the domain cut of \(F \vee G\), and so the sentence \(Ft \vee Gt\) will be neither true nor false. The resulting semantics for compounds is Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. My ambition has been to keep bivalence and classical logic within each model, not least since it makes quantification straightforward.

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Acknowledgments

Work on this paper was supported by a Grant from the Swedish Research Council (VR), for the project Vagueness and Context Factors.

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Correspondence to Peter Pagin.

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I am much indebted too comments from two anonymous referees, and from Richard Dietz, which all helped improve the paper a lot, catching an error I had made in comparing the definitions of Fine and Williamson. I also benefited from comments at the Tokyo conference, in particular by Nicholas Smith and Wlodek Rabinowitz. Versions of the talk have been presented at the LMPS congress in Beijing in 2007, at avagueness seminar at Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, in 2010, at a vagueness conference in Amsterdam in 2012, at the Vagueness and Probability Conference in Tokyo in 2013, and at the department of philosophy, Stockholm University, in March 2015. I am grateful to comments from many persons at those occasions, and there is not room to list all. Still, I’d like to mention in particular Jerry Seligman, Paul Egré, Denis Bonnay, Dave Ripley, Elia Zardini, Robert van Rooij, Chris Barker, Pablo Cobreros, Agustin Rayo, Jonas Åkerman, Dag Prawitz, Per Martin-Löf, Dag Westerståhl, Valentin Goranko, Anandi Hattiangadi, Åsa Wikforss, and Kathrin Glüer-Pagin.

Appendices

Appendix

Proof of fact 1

For any finite domain E, any \(F \in A_{S}\), and any measure function \({\mathscr {H}}_{F}\), there are \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}\), \(\delta _{F}\) and \(\epsilon _{F}\) such that (\({\mathscr {H}}\)-req) is satisfied.

Proof

Note first that if the domain is empty, (\({\mathscr {H}}\)-req) is trivially satisfied. For nonempty domain, we proceed by induction on the length of T sequences. The idea is to show that we can construct \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}\), \(\delta _{F}\) and \(\epsilon _{F}\), step by step, so as to make sure that (\({\mathscr {H}}\)-req) is met. Given \({\mathscr {H}}_{F}\) and E, we have a finite set V of real numbers such that \(V=\{{\mathscr {H}}_{F}(a): a \in E\}\).

For the base case, with \(l(\xi )=1\), we need to find a pair of real numbers ij, with \(i > j\), such that for any \(r \in V\), \(r>i\) or \(r<j\). This can clearly be done: pick any elements of V that are adjacent in the natural order, and pick i and j between these two, with \(i>j\). Then set \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\langle + \rangle )=i\) and \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\langle - \rangle )=j\).

For the inductive step, assume that (\({\mathscr {H}}\)-req) is satisfied for sequences of length k. There are \(2^{k+1}\) sequences \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle * \rangle \), where \(l(\xi )=k\). Again, let \(\overline{*}\) be \(-\) if \(*\) is \(+\), and vice versa. For each such \(\xi \), we need extend \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle * \rangle \) into \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle *,+ \rangle \) and \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle *,- \rangle \) such that, where \(d=|{\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle * \rangle )-{\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle \overline{*} \rangle )|\),

figure aq

in accordance with clauses iiia) - iiic) of Definition 2. To do this, we need to find two numbers \(\alpha \) and \(\beta \) such that for any of the \(2^{k+1}\) sequences \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle * \rangle \):

figure ar

Since \(\beta -\alpha \) can be arbitrarily small, this can again be done: Pick \(\beta \) such that for no \(r \in V\), \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )+\beta = r\), nor \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )-\beta = r\). \(\beta \) must in addition be chosen such that

figure as

for \(d'\) defined below, in order that clause iib) of Definition 2 is satisfied (we return this below).

Then pick some \(\alpha < \beta \). If some \(r' \in V\) satisfies either (i) or (ii), for some sequence \(\xi \) of length k, then replace \(\alpha \) by \(\alpha '\) such that \(\alpha <\alpha '<b\) and \(\alpha '\) does not satisfy (##) with respect to \(\xi \), \(\beta \), and \(r'\). This is possible, since \(\beta -\alpha '\) can be arbitrarily small. Repeat the procedure until you have a number \(\alpha ^{*}\) such that no \(r \in V\) satisfies (##) with respect to \(\alpha ^{*}\) and \(\beta \). Since V is finite and there are \(2^{k+1}\) sequences to consider, this process will come to an end.

Then extend the definition of \(\epsilon \) by setting \(\epsilon (d)=\beta \). Preliminarily extend the definition of \(\delta \) by setting \(\delta (d)=\beta -\alpha ^{*}\). We must check that clauses i) and ii) of Definition 2. are met. Let \(\xi =\xi '^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle \). Let \(d'=|{\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi '^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )-{\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi '^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )|\). For clause ib) of 2 it must hold that \(\delta (d)\le d\). If not, choose \(\alpha '\) such that \(\alpha ^{*}<\alpha '<\beta \), that meets this condition. It will also satisfy (##), since it is smaller than \(\beta \). Let \(\alpha '\) be the final choice. That is, we finally extend the definition of \(\delta \) by setting \(\delta (d)=\beta -\alpha '\).

We must also check that clause iib) is met. This holds if \(\epsilon (d)\le \epsilon (d')\), since by the ind. hyp. \(d \le d'\) (because by the ind. hyp. \(d = \delta (d')\)). Since \(\beta \) was chosen to satisfy \((\dagger )\), and \(\epsilon (d)=\beta \), this condition is met.

Finally, extend \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}\) by setting

figure at

We can verify that (i)–(iii) of (#) are satisfied. In case (iii), with \(*\) as +, we have:

figure au

The other cases are similar.

Finally, we verify that (\({\mathscr {H}}\)-req) is satisfied for \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,+ \rangle )\) and \({\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,- \rangle )\). Assume the contrary. Let \(r_{b} \in V\) be such that

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,- \rangle )\le r_{b} \le {\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,+ \rangle ) \end{aligned}$$

By (###), this means that

$$\begin{aligned} G_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )+ \alpha ' \le r_{b} \le G_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )+ \beta , \end{aligned}$$

contradicting (##) (with \(\alpha '\) instead of \(\alpha \)). The case for \(\langle -,+ \rangle \) and \(\langle -,- \rangle \) is similar. This completes the induction.\(\square \)

Proof of fact 2

For any higher-order gap model M for SL and any predicate \(F \in P_{S}\), for any \(a \in E\), if \(a \in [\![F ]\!]\), then for any \(b \in E\), if \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F}(b) |\le {\mathscr {T}}(F)\), then \(b \in [\![F ]\!]\).

Proof

By straightforward induction over degrees of predicates (number of occurrences of D), from (\({\mathscr {T}}\)) and Definition 2, we can show that

figure av

Further, it is immediate that

figure aw

Let’s say that atomic predicates are positive; and if F is positive [negative], then \(\lnot F\) is negative [positive]; and if F is positive [negative], then DF is positive [negative]. Let the degree of a predicate F be the number of occurrences of D in F. We show that the extensions of predicates follow the T-assignment in the following sense:

figure ax

Showing this is is sufficient, for the assumption that M is a higher-order gap model entails by definition that for any \(\xi \in T\), and any \(a \in E\), \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)>G_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )\) or \({\mathscr {H}}_{F}(a)<G_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )\). Then the Fact follows by (*) and (**): (***) together with the assumption that M is gap model (i.e. satisfies \({\mathscr {H}}-rec\)) delivers the antecedent of (**). (**) itself then delivers the consequent of (**). Using (*), we substitute the left-hand side of (*) for the right-hand side in the consequent of (**). We then have the Fact.

We prove (***) by induction over predicate degree. It holds for atomic F immediately by clause (ii) of (SLS). For the induction step, assume that F is a positive predicate of degree \(k+1\). Then either F is \(DF'\), where \(F'\) is a positive predicate, or F is \(\lnot DF'\), where \(F'\) is a negative predicate, of degree k. Assume the former. The other case is similar. By the induction hypothesis, there is a sequence \(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle \) such that \([\![F' ]\!]=\{a \in E: {\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)>{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )\}\), where \(l(\xi )=k\).

By clause (iv) of (SLS), and the definitions (\({\mathscr {T}}\)) and (\({\mathscr {S}}\)), \(a \in [\![DF' ]\!]\) iff for any \(b \in E\), \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b) |\le \epsilon ({\mathscr {T}}(F'))\) it holds that \(b \in [\![F' ]\!]\). By the induction hypothesis, if \(b \in [\![F' ]\!]\), then \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b)>{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )\). Hence, if \(a \in [\![DF' ]\!]\), then \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)>{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )+\epsilon ({\mathscr {T}}(F'))\). By (*), \({\mathscr {T}}(F')={\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )-{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )\). And by clause iiib) of Definition 2, \({\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,+ \rangle )={\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )+\epsilon ({\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )-{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle ))\). Therefore, if \(a \in [\![DF' ]\!]\), then \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)>{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle +,+ \rangle )\), as desired.

Then consider a negative predicate of degree \(k+1\). Assume that \(F'\) is positive, and consider \(\lnot DF'\). By (iii) of (SLS), \(a \in [\![\lnot DF' ]\!]\) just in case \(a \in E-[\![DF' ]\!]\). By the result for the positive case above, an object \(b \in [\![DF' ]\!]\) iff for some sequence \(\xi \) of length k, \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b)>{\mathscr {G}}_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle )\). Since M is a higher-order gap model, there is no object \(c \in E\) such that \(G_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle + \rangle ) \ge {\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c) \ge G_{F^{\circ }}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )\). Therefore, \(a \in [\![\lnot DF' ]\!]\) iff \({\mathscr {H}}_{F}(a)<{\mathscr {G}}_{F}(\xi ^{\smallfrown }\langle - \rangle )\), as desired. The other two cases (DF negative and \(\lnot DF\) positive) are similar. This completes the proof of (***).\(\square \)

Proof of fact 3

(SLS) validates (a) T, (b) RN, (c) B, and (d) modus ponens.

Proof

a)    The predicate counterpart of T is

figure ay

The validity is immediate from clause (iv) of (SLS), by clause ii) of Definition 2 and the definition (\({\mathscr {S}}\)) of the safety function \({\mathscr {S}}\). Since \({\mathscr {S}}(DF)\ge 0\), and hence \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a) \le {\mathscr {S}}(DF)\), \(a \in [\![F ]\!]\) if \(a \in [\![DF ]\!]\).

b) The predicate counterpart of RN is

figure az

It is valid. If \(\models F_{M}\), \([\![F ]\!]_{M}=E_{M}\). Then any \(a \in E_{M}\) satisfies the condition for \([\![DF ]\!]\), since it trivially holds for any \(a \in E_{M}\) that \(\forall b \in E_{M} \ (|{\mathscr {H}}_{F}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F}(b) |\le {\mathscr {S}}(DF)) \longrightarrow b \in [\![F ]\!]\).

c)    The predicate counterpart of B is

figure ba

(B\(_{\text {pred}}\)) is valid iff for any model M, \([\![F ]\!]_{M} \subseteq [\![D \lnot D \lnot F ]\!]_{M}\). To show that this holds, assume \(a \notin [\![D \lnot D \lnot F ]\!]\). By clause (iv) of (SLS), and clause (b) of (\({\mathscr {S}}\)), it then holds that

figure bb

Let \(b'\) be such a b. By (iii) of (SLS) we also have

figure bc

Let \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')| = j\), where \(0 \le j \le {\mathscr {S}}(DDF)\). This means that either \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')=j\), or \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')=-j\).

Again, by clause (iv) of (SLS), it holds that

figure bd

Since \({\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)={\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')+{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)\), it holds either that \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)|=|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)|+j\), or else that \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)|=|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(b')-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(c)|-j\)

It therefore follows from (§) and (§§) that

figure be

Since \({\mathscr {S}}(G)\ge 0\), for any G, it holds that \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)| \le j + {\mathscr {S}}(DF)\). Further, by the definitions of \({\mathscr {S}}\) and \({\mathscr {T}}\), and by clauses ib) and iib) of Definition 2, it holds that \({\mathscr {S}}(DDF) \le {\mathscr {S}}(DF)\), and hence that \(j \le {\mathscr {S}}(DF)\). Therefore, it also holds that \(|{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)-{\mathscr {H}}_{F^{\circ }}(a)| \le {\mathscr {S}}(DF) -j\). Either way, it then follows from (§§§) that \(a \notin [\![F ]\!]\). Hence, if \(a \notin [\![D \lnot D \lnot F ]\!]\), then \(a \notin [\![F ]\!]\), which establishes c).

d) The tolerance logic counterpart of modus ponens is valid:

figure bf

Immediate from (STL): if, by (ii) and (i), \([\![F ]\!]_{M} \subseteq [\![G ]\!]_{M}\) and \([\![F ]\!]_{M}=E_{M}\), then \([\![G ]\!]_{M}=E_{M}\).\(\square \)

Proof of fact 4

a):    

b):    

Proof

Proof of a). By means of a simple countermodel. Consider a set of men and the predicate ‘tall’ T. The central gap has size 1 cm and the upper edge at 180 cm. The \(\delta \) and \(\epsilon \) function are such that \(\delta (x)=0.9x\) and \(\epsilon (x)=10x\).

Then the upper boundary for being \(\lnot T\) is at 179 cm. The upper boundary for being \(D \lnot T\) is \(179-10\times 1 = 169\) cm. The lower boundary for being \(\lnot D \lnot T\) is \(169 + 0,9\times 1 = 169.9\) cm. The lower boundary for being \(D \lnot D \lnot T\) is \(169.9 + 10\times 0.9= 178.9\) cm. The lower boundary for being \(DD \lnot D \lnot T\) is then \(178.9 + 10\times 0.9\times 0.9=178.9+8.1=187\) cm. Repeating this, we find that the lower boundary for being \(D^{6}\lnot D \lnot T\) is greater than the lower boundary for being \(D^{4}T\), but that the result of prefixing both with D yields the reverse result: the lower boundary of being \(D^{7} \lnot D \lnot T\) is slightly lower than the lower boundary of being \(D^{5} T\). Hence, we have \(D^{6} \lnot D \lnot T \, \models _{M} D^{4}T\), but .

Proof of b). By means of counterexample. Let F be \(\lnot D \lnot D G\). We can show that \(F \models G\), by a reasoning that parallels the proof that (SLS) validates B. Here, I shall simplify the argument. Assume without loss of generality that G is a positive predicate (elements of its extension have higher measure than elements of its anti-extension). Let \(\gamma \) be \({\mathscr {T}}(G)\), and let \(\beta \) be the upper boundary of the G gap. We must now show that \([\![F ]\!] \subseteq [\![G ]\!]\), which means if an object a is in \([\![F ]\!]\), then its measure is not below the G gap. That is: \({\mathscr {H}}_{G^{\circ }}(a)\ge \beta -\gamma \).

The upper boundary \(F^{+}\) of the gap for F is, by Definition 2, calculated as:

figure bg

Since no element is in the G gap, any object above the lower boundary of the G gap in in G. So what we need is that \(F^{+}>\beta - \gamma \). That is

figure bh

Simplifying, this holds iff

figure bi

Since, by Definition 2, a) it holds that \(\gamma \ge \delta (\gamma )\), b) it holds that \(\epsilon (\gamma )\ge \epsilon (\delta (\gamma ))\), and c) it holds that \(\delta (\delta (\gamma ))>0\), (\(\circ \circ \circ \)) is true. Hence, \([\![F ]\!] \subseteq [\![G ]\!]\).

Nevertheless, by suitable choices of \(\epsilon \) and \(\delta \), we can have a model, along the lines of the proof of part a) of the Fact, where \([\![DF ]\!] \not \subseteq [\![DG ]\!]\) \(\square \)

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Pagin, P. Tolerance and higher-order vagueness. Synthese 194, 3727–3760 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0798-x

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