Abstract
My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem with this is that from our perspective on the history of science we know their argument is flawed. Consequently, we should not be impressed or persuaded by Fahrbach’s argument. Fahrbach has failed to identify a difference that matters between today’s theories and past theories. But realists need to find such a difference if they are to undermine the pessimistic induction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Nola (2008) also thinks that the history of science supports an optimistic induction.
The careful reader should note that it is the man of the world rather than the scientist who is driven to despair. At the end of the day, Poincaré suggests that the man of the world is seeing things the wrong way. Indeed, this is consistent with John Worrall’s reading of Poincaré (see Worrall 1989).
Laudan also notes that genuinely referential theories are not “invariably or even generally successful at the empirical level” (Laudan 1981, p. 24). The realist aims to show that empirical successes, like accurate predictions derived from a theory, are reliable indicators that (i) a theory is true and (ii) its theoretical terms genuinely refer. Laudan, though, aims to show that success is not a reliable indicator of either genuinely referring theoretical terms or truth, and that many theories with genuinely referring terms are not successful.
Lewis (2001) attempts to show that, even granting Laudan’s ratio of six once-successful but now rejected theories for every successful theory we still accept, it does not follow that our contemporary theories are likely false. Lewis makes the important observation that in order to know what inference to draw from the many successful false theories we also need to know the proportion of successful true theories, unsuccessful false theories, and unsuccessful true theories. Wray (2013) has taken issue with Lewis’ attack on the pessimistic induction.
It is not clear that all forms of scientific realism are equally threatened by the pessimistic induction. Structural realism does not seem vulnerable to this sort of argument (see Worrall 1989). Nor is Ian Hacking’s entity realism vulnerable to the pessimistic induction (see Hacking 1982). This issue, though, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Magnus and Callender (2004) claim that the pessimistic induction commits the base rate fallacy. Incidentally, they also believe that the No Miracles Argument commits the base rate fallacy. Lange (2002) suggests that the pessimistic induction commits the turnover fallacy. Lewis (2001) claims it commits a false positive fallacy. Saatsi (2005) argues that both Lange and Lewis are mistaken in their criticisms of the pessimistic induction.
These figures come from de solla Price’s (1963) work in scientometrics. Price predicted that the growth rate of science would slow down as the then-current growth rate could not be sustained for much longer. Fahrbach suggests that the exponential growth rate has continued in part because of the even more rapid growth rate in developing countries, specifically China and India (see Fahrbach 2011, p. 148). My criticisms do not concern this aspect of Fahrbach’s argument, so I will not discuss this assumption.
85 % is approximately six sevenths. Recall that Laudan claims that for every successful theory the realist can identify, he can identify six once-successful-but-now-rejected theories.
If 85 % of the theories developed before 1950 have been rejected, and these constitute only 20 % of the theories ever developed, then it seems that only 17 % of the theories ever developed have been rejected. Perhaps we should add to this number some number of theories that have been developed since 1950 which have already been rejected. Let us assume that about 4 % of the theories developed since 1950 have been discarded. The theories developed since 1950 constitute 80 % of the theories ever developed. Hence, an additional 3.2 % of all once-successful theories have been rejected. Thus, assuming these numbers are correct, only about 20 % of all theories have been rejected, a number that hardly supports a pessimistic induction.
I thank one of the referees for Synthese for suggesting that I distinguish between Fahrbach’s two aims, and clarifying the target of my own criticisms.
One referee pointed out that strictly speaking this argument cannot be run back indefinitely. At one point in the history of science, the pool of successful theories may be too small to warrant a conclusion about the prospects of future scientific theories.
The reader should be reminded of Stanford’s (2006) argument from unconceived alternatives.
Poincaré made a similar observation. ”Every age has scoffed at its predecessor, accusing it of having generalized too boldly or too naïvely. Descartes used to commiserate the Ionians (sic). Descartes in his turn makes us smile, and no doubt some day our children will laugh at us” (1952, pp. 140–141).
I thank one of the referees for emphasizing the need to distinguish between the number of theories and their persistence and for insisting that it is the latter that matters most. Lange’s (2002) analysis of the pessimistic induction focuses on this feature.
References
de solla Price, D. (1963). Little science, big science. New York: Columbia University Press.
Fahrbach, L. (2011). How the growth of science ends theory change. Synthese, 180, 139–155.
Hacking, I. (1982). Experimentation and scientific realism. Philosophical Topics, 13(1), 71–87.
Hardin, C. L., & Rosenberg, A. (1982). In defense of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 49, 604–615.
Kitcher, P. (1993). Advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lange, M. (2002). Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy. Analysis, 62, 281–285.
Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48, 19–48.
Lewis, P. (2001). Why the pessimistic induction is a fallacy. Synthese, 129(3), 371–380.
Magnus, P. D., & Callender, C. (2004). Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy. Philosophy of Science, 71, 320–338.
Montaigne, M. (1588/1948). Apology for Raymond Sebond. In D. M. Frame (Ed.), The complete essays of Montaigne (pp. 318–457). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Nola, R. (2008). The optimistic meta-induction and ontological continuity: The case of the electron. In L. Soler, H. Sankey, & P. Hoyningen-Huene (Eds.), Rethinking scientific change and theory comparison: Stabilities, ruptures, incommensurabilities (pp. 159–202). Dordrecht: Springer.
Poincaré, H. (1905/1952). Science and hypothesis. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.
Putnam, H. (1978). Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rescher, N. (1978). Scientific progress: A philosophical essay on the economics of research in natural science. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Saatsi, J. T. (2005). On the pessimistic induction and two fallacies. Philosophy of Science, 72, 1088–1098.
Stanford, P. K. (2006). Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43(1–2), 99–124.
Wray, K. B. (2013). Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debate. Synthese (forthcoming).
Acknowledgments
I thank Lori Nash, Raphaël Künstler, David Lambie, and Craig DeLancey for critical feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank the referees for Synthese for their constructive comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wray, K.B. The pessimistic induction and the exponential growth of science reassessed. Synthese 190, 4321–4330 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0276-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0276-2