Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle’s capacity to provide specific information about its target system—its informativeness—is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user’s aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this feature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Callender C., Cohen J.: There is no special problem about scientific representation. Theoria 55, 67–85 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  • Chakravartty A.: Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation. Synthese 72, 197–213 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Contessa G.: Scientific representation, interpretation, and surrogative reasoning. Philosophy of Science 74, 48–68 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • French S.: A model-theoretic account of representation (or, I don’t know much about art … but I know it involves isomorphism). Philosophy of Science 70, 1472–1483 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giere R. N.: How models are used to represent reality. Philosophy of Science 71, 742–752 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pincock C.: Overextending partial structures: Idealization and abstraction. Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 72, 1248–1259 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scarantino A., Piccinini G.: Information without truth. Metaphilosophy 41(3), 313–330 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suárez M.: Scientific representation: Against similarity and isomorphism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17(3), 225–244 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suárez M.: An inferential conception of scientific representation. Philosophy of Science 71, 767–779 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swoyer C.: Structural representation and surrogative reasoning. Synthese 87, 449–508 (1991)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vorms M.: Representing with imaginary models: Formats matter. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42, 287–295 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

    Agnes Bolinska

Authors
  1. Agnes Bolinska
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Agnes Bolinska.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bolinska, A. Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation. Synthese 190, 219–234 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0143-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0143-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation