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Inconsistency in natural languages

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Abstract

An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber.

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  1. Tufts University, Boston, USA

    Jody Azzouni

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  1. Jody Azzouni
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Correspondence to Jody Azzouni.

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Azzouni, J. Inconsistency in natural languages. Synthese 190, 3175–3184 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5

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