Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

Wolfgang Spohn

doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0023-5

Synthese

July 2012, Volume 187, Issue 1, pp 95–122

Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

Authors
Authors and affiliations

Wolfgang SpohnEmail author

Article

First Online:: 26 October 2011

Received:: 06 September 2008
Accepted:: 18 March 2009

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0023-5

Cite this article as:: Spohn, W. Synthese (2012) 187: 95. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0023-5

Abstract

The paper will show how one may rationalize one-boxing in Newcomb’s problem and drinking the toxin in the Toxin puzzle within the confines of causal decision theory by ascending to so-called reflexive decision models which reflect how actions are caused by decision situations (beliefs, desires, and intentions) represented by ordinary unreflexive decision models.

Keywords

Causal decision theoryEvidential decision theoryNewcomb’s problemToxin puzzleReflexive decision theory

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Authors and Affiliations

Wolfgang Spohn
- 1
Email author

1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany

Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

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Keywords

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