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Self-location is no problem for conditionalization

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Abstract

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs.

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  1. The City College of New York, 160 Convent Avenue, New York, NY, 10031, USA

    D. J. Bradley

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Bradley, D.J. Self-location is no problem for conditionalization. Synthese 182, 393–411 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9748-9

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