Abstract
A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument is illusory.
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Douven, I., Uffink, J. Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle. Synthese 184, 109–114 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9693-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9693-7