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In defence of virtue epistemology

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Abstract

In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology’s central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard’s objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.

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Correspondence to Christoph Kelp.

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Kelp, C. In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese 179, 409–433 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y

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