Abstract
This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41–60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts.
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Batens, D., Clercq, K.D., Verdée, P. et al. Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complex. Synthese 166, 113–131 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9268-4