Abstract
Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions.
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Hohwy, J. Functional integration and the mind. Synthese 159, 315–328 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9240-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9240-3