Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Functional integration and the mind

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bartels A., Zeki S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. NeuroImage 21(3): 1155–1166

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Damasio A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. NY, Grosset/Putnam

    Google Scholar 

  • Frackowiak R.S. (ed) (2004). Human brain function. London, Academic Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Friston K. (2002). Beyond phrenology: What can neuroimaging tell us about distributed circuitry?. Annual Review of Neuroscience 25(1): 221–250

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friston K.J. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 369(1456): 815–836

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frith C. (2005). The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 752

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gregory R.L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences 290(1038): 181–197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gregory R.L. (1996). What do qualia do. Perception 25(4): 377–379

    Google Scholar 

  • Gregory R.L. (1997). Knowledge in perception and illusion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 352(1358): 1121–1127

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gusnard D.A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 679

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haynes J.D., Deichmann R. et al. (2005). Eye-specific effects of binocular rivalry in the human lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature 438: 496

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helmholtz H.V. (1860). Treatise on physiological optics. New York, Dover

    Google Scholar 

  • Hohwy, J. (2007). The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. Psyche, 13(1).

  • Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., & Friston, K. (in prep.). Predictive coding and binocular rivalry.

  • MacKay, D. M. (1956). The epistemological problem for automata. In C. E. Shannon, & J. McCarthy (Eds.), Automata studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 235–251.

  • Mumford D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. Biological Cybernetics 66(3): 241

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neisser U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearl J. (2000). Causality. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Piccinini G. (2006). Computational explanation in neuroscience. Synthese 153(3): 343–353

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raichle M.E. (2006). The Brain’s Dark Energy. Science 314(5803): 1249–1250

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raichle M.E., MacLeod A.M. et al. (2001). A default mode of brain function. PNAS 98(2): 676–682

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tong F., Meng M. et al. (2006). Neural bases of binocular rivalry. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(11): 502

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uttal W.R. (2001). The New Phrenology. Cambridge: Mass, MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J. (2003). Making Things Happen. New York, Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jakob Hohwy.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hohwy, J. Functional integration and the mind. Synthese 159, 315–328 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9240-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9240-3

Keywords

Navigation