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The evidential support theory of conditionals

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Abstract

According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Igor Douven

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  1. Igor Douven
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Douven, I. The evidential support theory of conditionals. Synthese 164, 19–44 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9214-5

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