Skip to main content
Log in

Warrant without truth?

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant. Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and uses that puzzle to generate a new argument for Warrant Fallibilism, the view that false beliefs can have warrant. Section 6 evaluates this pro-Fallibilism argument, finding ultimately that it defeats itself in a surprising way. I conclude that neither Infallibilism nor Fallibilism should now constrain theorizing about warrant.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Armstrong D. (1973). Belief, truth and knowledge. New York, Cambridge UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Audi R. (2003). Epistemology. New York, Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • Audi R. (1993). The structure of justification. New York, Cambridge UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett J. (1974). Counterfactuals and possible worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, 381–402

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett J. (2003). A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Bigelow, J. No Possibility of Error (http://www.arts.monash.edu/phil/department/bigelow/error.html). David and Warfield: No update available.

  • BonJour L. (1996). Plantinga on knowledge and proper function. In: Kvanvig J.(ed) Warrant in contemporary epistemology. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 47–71

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm R. (1982). The foundations of knowing. Minneapolis, U of Minnesota P

    Google Scholar 

  • David M. (2001). Truth as the epistemic goal. In: Steup M.(ed) Knowledge, truth, and duty. New York, Oxford UP, pp. 151–169

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • David M., Warfield, T. (forthcoming). Knowledge closure and skepticism. In Q. Smith (Ed.), New essays in epistemology. New York: Oxford UP

  • Dretske F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine K. (1975). Critical notice: counterfactuals. By D. Lewis. Mind 84, 451–458

    Google Scholar 

  • Gettier E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge?. Analysis 23, 121–123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy 64, 355–372

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman A. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Greene R., Balmert N.A. (1997). Two notions of warrant and Plantinga’s solution to the Gettier problem. Analysis 57, 132–139

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawthorne J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Hetherington S. (1996). Knowledge puzzles. Boulder, CO: Westview

    Google Scholar 

  • Hilpinen R. (1988). Knowledge and conditionals. Philosophical Perspectives 2, 157–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Howard-Snyder D., Howard-Snyder F., Feit N. (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier’s legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, 304–327

    Google Scholar 

  • Huemer M. (2005). Logical properties of warrant. Philosophical Studies 122, 171–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein P. (1996). Warrant, proper function, reliabilism, and defeasibility. In: Kvanvig J.(ed) Warrant in contemporary epistemology. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig J. (2004). Nozickian epistemology and the value of knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14, 201–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer K. (1965). Knowledge, truth, and evidence. Analysis 25, 168–175

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loux M. (2006). Metaphysics. New York, Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • McGrew T., McGrew L. (1998). Internalism and the collapse of the Gettier problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 23, 239–256

    Google Scholar 

  • Merricks T. (1995). Warrant entails truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 841–855

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merricks T. (1997). More on warrant’s entailing truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 627–631

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merricks T. (2001). Objects and persons. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelkin D. (2000). The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality. Philosophical Review 109, 373–409

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Penczek A. (1997). Counterfactuals with true components. Erkenntnis 46, 79–85

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga A. (1996). Respondeo. In: Kvanvig J.(ed) Warrant in contemporary epistemology. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga A. (1997). Warrant and accidentally true belief. Analysis 57, 140–145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pojman L. (2001). What can we know?: An introduction to the theory of knowledge. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth

    Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryan S. (1996). Does warrant entail truth?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, 183–192

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sainsbury R.M. (1997). Easy possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 907–919

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sosa E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141–153

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturgeon S. (1993). The Gettier problem. Analysis 53, 156–164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Unger P. (1968). An analysis of factual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 65, 157–170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen P. (1997). Against middle knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21, 225–236

    Google Scholar 

  • Warfield T. (2005). Knowledge from falsehood. Philosophical Perspectives 19, 405–416

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weatherson B. (2003). What good are counterexamples?. Philosophical Studies 115, 1–31

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams M. (1978). Inference, justification and the analysis of knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 75, 249–263

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski L. (1994). The inescapability of Gettier problems. Philosophical Quarterly 44, 65–73

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of Knowledge. New York, Cambridge UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski L. (1999). What is knowledge?. In: Greco J., Sosa E.(eds) The Blackwell guide to epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to E. J. Coffman.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Coffman, E.J. Warrant without truth?. Synthese 162, 173–194 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9178-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9178-5

Keywords

Navigation