Abstract
Susan Haack has always maintained that her unquestionably important foundherentist theory of epistemic justification is not a foundationalism. In a 1997 Synthese exchange, Laurence BonJour questioned her right to this claim, and she dug in and defended it. What was at stake is of timeless importance to epistemology: it goes directly to the question, “What is foundationalism?” I inquire with greater care than either Haack or BonJour took in 1997, and I find decisively in favor of the view that foundherentism is a foundationalism. In the process, I explore the outer limits of foundationalism: I examine just how far a foundationalism can go in allowing the relevance of coherence to epistemic justification.
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Tramel, P. Haack’s foundherentism is a foundationalism. Synthese 160, 215–228 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9108-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9108-y